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INTRODUCTION
The United States is the world’s largest importing country, with
1
nearly $2 trillion in imports of goods during 2007. Given the everincreasing volume of international trade, the United States has put in
place an intricate body of laws designed to regulate the flow of goods
and has created federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of
2
those laws, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”),
the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), the U.S.
International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”), and the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”). Each agency is
charged with different responsibilities over the fair and efficient
administration of the United States’ international trade regime.
Certain international trade disputes arise at the agency level,
however, which in turn creates a role for the U.S. courts.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal
3
Circuit”), created in 1982, has exclusive jurisdiction over any “appeal
from a final decision of the United States Court of International
4
Trade.” The U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”), in turn, has
exclusive jurisdiction over numerous types of civil actions arising
under the international trade laws including, inter alia, disputes
5
related to the classification and valuation of imported merchandise,
Commerce’s and the ITC’s determinations in antidumping and
6
countervailing duty proceedings, and any other action relating to the
7
administration and enforcement of international trade laws. Given
the broad range of issues under the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction, the
Federal Circuit is frequently called upon to address a multitude of
different legal questions involving international trade issues.
1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES: ANNUAL REVISION FOR 2007 4 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2008pr/04/ft900.pdf
(reporting that the United States imported $1.97 trillion in goods during calendar
year 2007).
2. The U.S. Customs Service became U.S. Customs and Border Protection
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1502, 116 Stat.
2135, 2308–09 (Nov. 25, 2002), and the Reorganization Plan Modification for the
Department of Homeland Security, H.R. Doc. No. 108-32, at 4 (2003). For simplicity,
this Article refers to the agency as “CBP” throughout even though some cases arose
from events that occurred when the agency was still known as the U.S. Customs
Service.
3. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982) (creating the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and detailing the
court’s structure).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2006).
5. Id. § 1581(a).
6. Id. § 1581(c).
7. Id. § 1581(i).
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In 2008, the Federal Circuit considered numerous appeals in
international trade cases, ranging from basic procedural questions
such as whether the CIT had jurisdiction over a matter or whether a
plaintiff had standing to raise a claim, to substantive questions
involving CBP’s tariff classifications or Commerce’s methodologies
for calculating antidumping duty margins. This Article subdivides
these issues into four categories: U.S. customs laws, U.S. trade
remedies laws, actions by the USTR, and trade and the environment.
Although the case summaries focus primarily on the complex factual
and legal issues at the center of each dispute, they also offer insights
into the varying standards of review and levels of deference that the
appeals court extends depending on the type of action under review.
I.

U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS

Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power
8
“[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and “[t]o
9
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” Through legislation
codified in Title 19 of the U.S. Code, “Customs Duties,” Congress
delegated to CBP significant responsibilities with respect to the
facilitation of entry of merchandise into the United States and the
10
collection of duties, taxes, and fees on imported merchandise. In
2008, the Federal Circuit issued numerous decisions concerning
CBP’s administration of the customs laws. As described in this
section, more than half of the customs cases related to questions of
classification under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
11
States (“HTSUS”).
The remaining cases concerned substantive
issues regarding the appraisal of imported merchandise, the
imposition of penalties on importers, and the constitutionality of a
CBP regulation, as well as jurisdictional questions.

8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
9. Id. § 8, cl. 3.
10. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006) (setting forth the statutory provisions
governing CBP’s administration of the customs laws).
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006) (setting forth the authorization for the HTSUS).
The actual HTSUS does not appear in the U.S. Code but, rather, is maintained by
the ITC and published on the agency’s website pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 3007 (2006).
From its Tariff Information Center webpage, users can link to either the full HTSUS
or to an index that will direct them to the text of specific chapters. See U.S.
International Trade Commission, Tariff Information Center, http://www.usitc.gov/
tata/hts/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). For the full HTSUS, see U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (21st ed.
2009) [hereinafter HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE], http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/
tata/hts/bychapter/0901htsa.pdf.
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A. Tariff Classification
The CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions involving CBP’s
12
tariff classification determinations under the HTSUS. The HTSUS
represents a hierarchical system for classifying articles and is
organized into ninety-nine separate chapters that consolidate
13
different commodities. Within each chapter, the HTSUS identifies
14
distinct articles based on ten-digit subheadings. Tariff classifications
are extremely important because they determine the appropriate rate
of duty, if any, which applies to articles upon importation into the
U.S. customs territory, and they are also used to compile official
15
import data. The first six digits of each HTSUS subheading are
internationally agreed upon product classifications pursuant to the
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity
16
Description and Coding System. The final four digits are specific to
the United States, with the seventh and eighth digits conveying the
applicable rate of normal customs duties and the ninth and tenth
17
digits used only for statistical reporting purposes.
Importers have an obligation to exercise reasonable care with
18
respect to the classification of merchandise upon entry, and CBP
has the authority to impose penalties if importers misclassify articles
19
due to negligence, gross negligence, or fraud. When a genuine
ambiguity exists with respect to the proper classification of an article,
importers will of course seek to classify the articles under the HTSUS
subheading that imposes the lowest possible duty rate and, thus, may
be aggressive with respect to their classifications. However, after
reviewing the entry documentation (and possibly the article itself),
CBP may reclassify the imported articles into different HTSUS
12. § 1581(a)–(b).
13. See U.S. International Trade Commission, Tariff Information Center, By
Chapter Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (last visited Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/bychapter/index.htm
(establishing the HTSUS,
listed by chapter and general notes).
14. See generally id. (listing the classifications of articles by heading and
subheading).
15. Preface to HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 11, available at
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0901_Preface.pdf.
16. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 3001 (2006) (explaining that the HTSUS implements
“the nomenclature established internationally by the” International Convention on
the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System).
17. Preface to HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 11, http://hotdocs.
usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0901_Preface.pdf.
18. See 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (2006) (setting forth importers’ obligations to
exercise reasonable care when filing entry summaries with CBP and declaring the
applicable tariff classification and appraised values of the imported articles).
19. See id. § 1592 (authorizing the imposition of penalties against importers for
negligence, gross negligence, or fraud with respect to the importation of
merchandise).
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subheadings with different rates of duty than the importer claimed.
In 2008, the Federal Circuit decided seven classification cases in
which importers appealed CBP’s reclassification of imported articles
under HTSUS subheadings that carried higher duty rates than the
ones that they originally declared upon entry.
The first tariff classification case decided in 2008, MetChem, Inc. v.
20
United States, involved the proper classification of basic nickel
carbonate. MetChem, Inc. (“MetChem”) classified the article under
HTSUS subheading 7501.20.00, which encompasses, “Nickel mattes,
nickel oxide sinters, and other intermediate products of
metallurgy: . . . Nickel oxide sinters and other intermediate products
21
of metallurgy,” and extends duty-free treatment. Upon liquidation,
however, CBP reclassified the article under HTSUS subheading
2836.99.50,
“Carbonates;
peroxocarbonates
(percarbonates);
commercial ammonium carbonates containing ammonium
22
carbamate,” which imposes an ad valorem duty of 3.7 percent.
MetChem appealed CBP’s decision to the CIT, which ruled in
MetChem’s favor after concluding that HTSUS heading 2836 did not
apply to MetChem’s imported basic nickel carbonate because it was
limited to “[s]eparate chemical elements and separate chemically
23
The lower court held that basic nickel
defined compounds.”
carbonate represented an “intermediate product of metallurgy” and
24
should be classified instead under HTSUS heading 7501.
In affirming the CIT’s decision, the Federal Circuit first explained
that interpretations of HTSUS headings and subheadings are
questions of law that it examines de novo, without deference to the
lower court, as opposed to the CIT’s factual findings that it examines
25
only for “clear error.” The court then agreed with the CIT that CBP
improperly classified the basic nickel carbonate under HTSUS
heading 2836 because the article was neither a “separate chemical
26
element” nor a “separate chemically defined compound.” First, the

20. 513 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
21. Id. at 1344.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1345 (citing Metchem, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1275
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)).
24. Id. at 1346 (citing Metchem, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1275).
25. See id. at 1345 (explaining that the Federal Circuit “has an independent
responsibility to decide the legal issue of the proper meaning and scope of HTSUS
terms”) (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 407 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
26. See id. at 1346 (defining a “separate chemically defined compound” as “a
substance which consists of one molecular species (e.g. covalent or iconic) whose
composition is defined by a constant ratio of elements and can be represented by a
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Federal Circuit observed that all parties agreed that the imported
27
article was not a “separate chemical element.” Second, the court
concluded that the basic nickel carbonate at issue was not a “separate
chemically defined compound,” as defined by the Explanatory Notes
28
accompanying Chapter 28 of the HTSUS, because it consisted of an
unspecified mixture of “several chemical compounds in a variable
29
ratio” that “cannot be represented by a precise formula.” As such,
the court agreed that the basic nickel carbonate could not be
classified under HTSUS heading 2836 but, rather, should be
classified under HTSUS subheading 7501.20.00 because it was an
30
intermediate product.
31
In Fuji America Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit reviewed
the tariff classification of: (1) “chip placers,” which are machines
used to place various electrical components onto blank printed
circuit boards (“PCBs”) that, in turn, create finished printed circuit
assemblies (“PCAs”); and (2) “parts feeders,” which supply the
32
various electrical components to the chip placers. CBP classified
both the chip placers and the parts feeders under HTSUS
subheading 8479.89.97, which covers “[m]achines and mechanical
appliances having individual functions, not specified or included
33
elsewhere in this chapter; parts thereof . . . .” The importer, Fuji
America Corporation (“Fuji”), maintained that CBP should classify
the chip placers under HTSUS subheading 8428.90.00, “Other lifting,

definitive structural diagram” (quoting HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 11,
at ch. 28, n.1(a), http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0901c28.pdf).
27. Id.
28. See generally Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(explaining that the Explanatory Notes constitute a supplement to the HTSUS that
are “generally indicative of . . . [its] proper interpretation . . . .” (quoting H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 549 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1582)); Mita Copystar Am., Inc. v. United States, 21 F.3d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (clarifying that, although the Explanatory Notes “do not constitute controlling
legislative history,” they “are intended to clarify the scope of HTSUS . . . and to offer
guidance in interpreting” the HTSUS headings and subheadings (citing Lynteq,
976 F.2d at 699)).
29. MetChem, 513 F.3d at 1347. In so holding, the Federal Circuit noted that,
when evaluating the appropriate tariff classification for an imported article, the
courts must first rely upon the HTSUS “headings and any relative section or chapter
notes,” and then “may consult the Explanatory Notes of the relevant chapters,
although they are not binding . . . .” Id. at 1346 (citing Michael Simon Design v.
United States, 501 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted)).
30. See id. at 1348 (rejecting the Government’s claim that the basic nickel
carbonate did not qualify as an “intermediate” metallurgical product because the
HTSUS does not impose any requirements about the particular nickel content
applicable to “intermediate products of metallurgy”).
31. 519 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
32. See id. at 1356 (describing the functions of chip placers and parts feeders).
33. Id. at 1357–58.
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handling, loading or unloading machinery (for example, elevators,
escalators, conveyers, teleferics): Other machinery,” and the parts
feeders under HTSUS heading 8431, “Parts suitable for use solely or
34
principally with the machinery of headings 8425 to 8430.”
Fuji commenced an action at the CIT after CBP denied its protest.
With respect to the chip placers, the CIT granted summary judgment
to the Government after concluding that CBP properly classified
35
them under HTSUS heading 8479. The lower court reasoned that
HTSUS heading 8479 covers machines with a principal purpose that
is not otherwise covered by any other HTSUS heading, and the chip
placers’ principal function—“to perform an active and integral role
in making PCAs”—was not specifically described anywhere in Chapter
36
84 of the HTSUS. With respect to the parts feeders, however, the
CIT disagreed with both parties and ruled that they should be
classified under subheading 8479.90.9595 covering “other” parts of
37
machines and mechanical appliances.
After the CIT denied the Government’s motion for partial
rehearing with respect to the classification of the parts feeders, Fuji
filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit concerning the classification
of the chip placers and the Government filed a cross-appeal
38
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
concerning the parts feeders.
39
CIT’s ruling with respect to both articles. First, the court noted that
“for purposes of HTSUS Chapter 84, the principal purpose of the goods
40
Because the chip placers
determines their tariff classification.”
served multiple purposes, but their principal purpose was “to
perform an active and integral role in making PCAs”—a function that
neither HTSUS heading 8428 nor any other heading under HTSUS
Chapter 84 specifically described—they were properly classified
41
under the catchall heading 8479, the court concluded.
Second, with respect to the parts feeders, the Federal Circuit
observed that Explanatory Note B to HTSUS heading 8479 sets forth
two criteria for determining whether a device that depends on
another machine can nevertheless be classified as an independent
machine: “[T]he device’s function (i) is distinct from that which is
34. Id.; see also HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 11, at ch. 84, p. 34, 37,
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0901c84.pdf.
35. Fuji Am. Corp., 519 F.3d at 1357.
36. Id. at 1357 (quoting Fuji Am. Corp. v. United States, 03-CV-00126 2006 Ct.
Int’l Trade LEXIS 116, at *27 (July 26, 2006)).
37. Id. (citing Fuji Am. Corp., 2006 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 116, at *34).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1346.
40. Id. at 1358–59 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 1357 (quoting Fuji Am. Corp., 2006 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 116, at *27).
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performed by the machine or appliance whereon they are to be
mounted, . . . and (ii) [the device] does not play an integral and
inseparable part in the operation of such machine, appliance, or
42
entity.” All parties agreed that the first criterion had been satisfied
because the function of parts feeders is distinct from the chip
43
placers. The court rejected the Government’s contention that parts
feeders are machines with individual functions, instead affirming the
CIT’s ruling that parts feeders “are integral and inseparable for the
operation of the chip placers” and, therefore, should be classified
under HTSUS subheading 8479.90.9595 because no other specific
44
subheading existed for them.
Thus, in Fuji America Corp., the Federal Circuit consulted the
Explanatory Notes for guidance in interpreting the HTSUS headings
45
and subheadings. In two other cases, the Federal Circuit provided
more in-depth discussions of the role of the Explanatory Notes in
guiding its review of CIT classification decisions. In Agfa Corp. v.
46
United States, the Federal Circuit relied heavily on the Explanatory
Notes to support its legal analysis. CBP classified Agfa Corporation’s
(“Agfa”) entries of metal plates coated with photosensitive emulsion
under HTSUS subheading 3701.30.00 covering “[p]hotographic
plates and film in the flat, sensitized, unexposed, of any material
other than paper, paperboard or textiles; instant print film in the flat,
sensitized, unexposed, whether or not in packs: . . . [o]ther plates
and film, with any side exceeding 255 mm” and requiring an ad
47
valorem duty of 3.7 percent. Agfa filed a protest in which it argued
that the articles should be classified under HTSUS subheading
8442.50.10, which covers “printing plates” and were entitled to dutyfree treatment, because the trade referred to the articles as “printing
48
plates” and because they were used for printing applications. Agfa
49
commenced an action at the CIT after CBP denied the protest.

42. Id. at 1359–60 (citing WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, HARMONIZED
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION AND CODING SYSTEM, EXPLANATORY NOTES § XVI,
ch. 84.79(B)).
43. Id. at 1360.
44. See id. (explaining that parts feeders are not machines with individual
functions because they depend on the chip placers’ operations).
45. Id. at 1359–60.
46. 520 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-00352 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14019 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2008), cert. denied, No. 08-299 2008 U.S. LEXIS
7752 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2008) (discussing the Explanatory Notes of the HTSUS), at 1329–
30.
47. Id. at 1329.
48. Id. at 1328.
49. Id. at 1327–28.
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The CIT affirmed CBP’s classification of Agfa’s metal plates under
HTSUS subheading 3701.30.00 in part because of information
50
derived from the Explanatory Notes to headings 3701 and 8442.
The lower court found that the Explanatory Notes for HTSUS
heading 3701 stated that “photographic plates” for purposes of that
heading “may be made from a variety of materials and used in
51
photomechanical processes.” In contrast, the Explanatory Notes for
HTSUS heading 8442, where Agfa sought classification, did not refer
to photosensitive materials and, in fact, specifically excluded “plates
52
coated with a photographic emulsion” similar to those at issue.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision to
sustain CBP’s classification after reviewing the definition of
“photographic” in the headnote to Chapter 37 of the HTSUS and the
53
Explanatory Notes to HTSUS heading 3701. It concluded that those
sources demonstrated that the imported plates were prima facie
classifiable under HTSUS heading 3701 because they constituted
“photographic” plates, as described by the Explanatory Notes,
because “a visible image is formed directly on the photosensitive
surface by the action of light on that surface, and visible images are
54
formed indirectly on paper by the action of light on that surface.”
At the same time, the Federal Circuit rejected Agfa’s argument that
the imported plates were per se classifiable under HTSUS heading
55
8442 because that heading refers to “printing plates.” The court
explained that “[w]hile the language of heading 8442 might allow for
some ambiguity, the Explanatory Notes to heading 8442 do not”
because they explicitly clarify that heading 8442 excludes metal plates
coated with sensitized photographic emulsion, which is precisely what
56
Agfa had imported. Thus, the Federal Circuit relied on the text of
the Explanatory Notes to affirm the CIT’s holding that the imported
metal plates were properly classifiable under HTSUS subheading

50. Id. at 1330.
51. Id. at 1328.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1329–30. The appeals court employed a two-step standard for reviewing
whether, as a matter of law, the CIT’s classification decision was reasonable:
“(1) determining the proper meaning of the tariff provisions, which is a question of
law; and (2) determining which heading the particular merchandise falls within,
which is a question of fact.” Id. at 1328 (citing Cummins Inc. v. United States, 454
F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
54. Id. at 1329.
55. Id. at 1330.
56. See id. (clarifying that “while the Explanatory Notes are not binding, they are
persuasive authority, and Agfa provides no convincing reason to disregard such
clearly relevant guidance”).
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3701.30.00, whereas the HTSUS excludes plates with photosensitive
57
coatings from heading 8442.
58
Another case decided in 2008, Drygel, Inc. v. United States,
addressed the relevance of the Explanatory Notes. In that case, the
Federal Circuit reviewed the tariff classification of a breath–
freshening product labeled “Gel-A-Mint MagikStrips®,” which
consisted of “thin, sugar-free, flavored strips of consumable material
59
that dissolve when placed on the tongue.” Upon entry, Drygel, Inc.
(“Drygel”) classified the articles under HTSUS subheading
3306.90.00, which covers “[p]reparations for oral or dental
60
hygiene . . . [o]ther” and extended duty-free treatment.
CBP,
however, reclassified them under a catchall HTSUS subheading
2106.90.99, which applies to “[f]ood preparations not elsewhere
specified or included: . . . [o]ther” and imposes a 6.4 percent ad
61
valorem duty.
In a court action commenced by Drygel over CBP’s reclassification,
the CIT granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment
and sustained CBP’s classification of the articles under HTSUS
62
In doing so, the CIT relied on Warnersubheading 2106.90.99.
63
Lambert Co. v. United States, in which the Federal Circuit previously
held “Certs® Powerful Mints” should be classified under HTSUS
subheading 3306.90.00—and not under HTSUS subheading
2106.90.99—because they performed “breakdown, absorption, and
purging” oral cleansing activities despite not containing any
64
antimicrobial agents for hygienic functions. Thus, the CIT in Drygel
reasoned that the Gel-A-Mint MagikStrips® did not constitute
“preparations for oral or dental hygiene” because, unlike Certs®
Powerful Mints, they did not perform “breakdown, absorption, and
purging” cleansing activities or otherwise contain antimicrobial
65
In addition, the CIT dismissed as “non-binding” and
agents.
57. See id. at 1329–30 (“Explanatory notes are not legally binding but may be
consulted for guidance and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of a
tariff provision.” (quoting Degussa Corp. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1044, 1047 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted))).
58. 541 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
59. Id. at 1131.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1130.
63. 407 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
64. Drygel, Inc., 541 F.3d at 1132–33 (citing Warner-Lambert Co., 407 F.3d at 1208,
1210-11). The Federal Circuit observed that the Explanatory Note to Chapter 33 of
the HTSUS provides that “products of heading 3306 need not ‘contain subsidiary
pharmaceutical or disinfectant constituents,’ nor be held out ‘as having therapeutic
or prophylactic value.’” Id. at 1131 (citing Warner-Lambert, 407 F.3d at 1210).
65. Id. at 1133.
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irrelevant the Federal Circuit’s previous finding in Warner-Lambert
that HTSUS heading 3306 covers “mouth washes and oral perfumes”
pursuant to the clarifications in the Explanatory Notes, instead
interpreting Warner-Lambert as holding that the mints at issue there
constituted a “hygiene” product for purposes of heading 3306
because they performed cleansing activities, whereas Drygel’s Gel-A66
Mint MagikStrips® did not.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT and instead found
that the Gel-A-Mint MagikStrips® should be classified under HTSUS
67
subheading 3306.90.00.
The court held that the CIT’s
68
“interpretation of Warner-Lambert was too restrictive.” Products do
not need to contain antimicrobial agents in order to be classified
69
under HTSUS heading 3306, the court reasoned.
Although the
articles at issue in Warner-Lambert contained “breakdown, absorption,
and purging effects,” the court clarified that it did not hold that
articles must contain these cleansing properties in order to be
70
classified under HTSUS subheading 3306.90.00. It then held that
all “oral perfumes” are not prima facie classifiable under heading
3306, but that heading 3306 nonetheless encompasses articles that
“mask oral malodors” (i.e., “perfume” the mouth) even if they do not
contain additional cleansing agents that “deodorize” (i.e., “chemically
71
neutralize”) the mouth.
Thus, the Federal Circuit clarified its
previous finding in Warner-Lambert and held that articles do not
require cleansing effects to be classified under HTSUS subheading
72
3306.90.00.
However, in another case decided in 2008, the Federal Circuit
departed from the guidelines in the Explanatory Notes in favor of the
73
plain language of the HTSUS. Airflow Technology, Inc. v. United States
involved the tariff classification of Sperifilt filter media used in air
filtration mechanisms for filtering dirt and other particles from
74
CBP classified the imported filter media
circulating air supply.
66. Id. at 1132–33 (citing Drygel, Inc. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1371,
1379 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
67. Id. at 1136.
68. Id. at 1134.
69. Id.
70. Id. (clarifying that Warner-Lambert did not establish exclusive criteria for
determining whether an article is classifiable under HTSUS heading 3306).
71. Id. at 1135. In so holding, the Federal Circuit found that the Explanatory
Notes to HTSUS heading 3306 were “persuasive” and “‘generally indicative’ of the
proper interpretation of a tariff provision . . . absent persuasive reasons to disregard
it.” Id. at 1134 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 1135–36.
73. 524 F.3d 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
74. Id. at 1289.
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under HTSUS subheading 5911.40.00, which covers “[t]extile
products and articles, for technical uses, . . . ; [s]training cloth of a
kind used in oil presses or the like” and imposed ad valorem duty rates of
75
11 percent in 1998 and 10.5 percent in 1999. Airflow Technology,
Inc. (“Airflow”) protested the decision, arguing that the limiting
language “of a kind used in oil presses or the like” meant that HTSUS
subheading 5911.40.00 applied only to straining cloths that separate
solids from liquids—as oil presses do—and not to products like its
76
Airflow
filter media that separate solids from gases (e.g., air).
argued that its filter media should instead be classified under HTSUS
subheading 5603.94.90, which covers “[n]onwovens, whether or not
impregnated, coated, covered or laminated . . . other” and carries
duty-free treatment, because, according to the Explanatory Notes,
77
heading 5603 covers “sheets for filtering liquids or air.”
Airflow commenced an action at the CIT after CBP denied its
protest. The CIT sustained CBP’s classification under HTSUS
subheading 5911.40.00, interpreting the term “straining cloth” under
that subheading to include both filters that separate solids from
78
liquids and filters that separate solids from gases.
It further
interpreted the phrase “oil presses and the like” under HTSUS
subheading 5911.40.00 as covering “‘oil presses and other filtering
mechanisms,’ including filtering mechanisms that filtered solids from
79
Because the Sperifilt filter media separated solids from
gases.”
gases, the CIT ruled that it fell within the definition of HTSUS
80
subheading 5911.40.00.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT erroneously
interpreted the term “straining cloth” under HTSUS subheading
5911.40.00 as including products that separate solids from gases, and
81
it reversed and remanded the CIT’s ruling. The court first held that
the plain meaning of the term “straining cloth” refers only to articles
that separate solids from liquids, whereas the plain meaning of the
term “filtering” refers to the separation of solids from liquids or
82
gases. Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that “straining” cloths

75. Id. at 1290 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 1289.
77. Id. at 1289–90.
78. Id. at 1290.
79. Id. (citing Airflow Tech., Inc. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1293.
82. Id. at 1291–92.
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and “filtering” cloths are not interchangeable and that the CIT
83
erroneously equated Airflow’s filtering media to straining cloths.
The Federal Circuit next performed an ejusdem generis analysis of
the phrase “of a kind used in oil presses or the like” appearing in HTSUS
subheading 5911.40.00. The court explained that, under the
principle of ejusdem generis, articles covered by the general phrase “or
the like” must “possess the same essential characteristic of the specific
84
enumerated article.”
The court then reasoned that because oil
presses only separate solids from liquids, whereas Airflow’s filter
media separates solids from gases, the filter media did not have the
same essential characteristic as oil presses and, thus, should not be
85
classified under HTSUS subheading 5911.40.00. Finally, although
the Explanatory Note to heading 5911 indicates that subheading
5911.40.00 applies broadly to any type of filtering cloth, including
those filtering air, the Federal Circuit nonetheless concluded that the
Explanatory Note should not be accorded any weight because it
contradicted the plain and unambiguous language of HTSUS
subheading 5911.40.00, which limited that subheading to only those
86
products that separate solids from liquids. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit remanded the case to the CIT with instructions to determine
87
the appropriate HTSUS classification of the Sperifilt filter media.
The court implicated the principle of ejusdem generis in another
88
2008 decision, Deckers Corp. v. United States, which addressed the
proper tariff classification of Teva® Sport Sandals. The article at
issue consisted of athletic footwear with open toe and heel sections
89
and upper sections that did not enclose the wearer’s foot and ankle.
CBP classified these sandals under HTSUS subheading 6404.19.35,
which covers “[f]ootwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics . . . and
uppers of textile materials . . . [o]ther . . . with open toes or open
heels . . . [o]ther,” and carries an ad valorem duty rate of 37.5
90
percent. The importer, Deckers Corporation (“Deckers”), argued
that its sandals should be classified under the more specific HTSUS
subheading 6404.11.80 covering athletic footwear described as
“[f]ootwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or

83. Id. at 1292.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1292–93.
87. Id. at 1293.
88. 532 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, No. 08-1011 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25137 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2008).
89. Id. at 1313.
90. Id.
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composition leather and uppers of textile materials . . . [f]ootwear
with outer soles of rubber or plastics: . . . [s]ports footwear; tennis
shoes, basketball shoes, gym shoes, training shoes and the like . . .
[v]alued over $6.50 but not over $12/pair,” with an ad valorem duty
91
rate of 20 percent plus $0.90 per pair. According to Deckers, its
Teva® sandals were athletic footwear “like the exemplars ‘tennis
shoes, basketball shoes, gym shoes, [and] training shoes’” referenced
in HTSUS subheading 6404.11.80 and, therefore, should be classified
92
thereunder.
After CBP denied a protest that Deckers filed, an action followed at
the CIT, which affirmed CBP’s determination that the Teva® sandals
93
On
should be classified under HTSUS subheading 6404.19.35.
94
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s classification ruling.
First, the court held that the plain language of HTSUS subheading
6404.11.80 demonstrated that Congress intended to include therein
only athletic footwear that were “tennis shoes, basketball shoes, gym
95
shoes, training shoes,” or athletic footwear like these exemplars.
The court explained that Deckers improperly interpreted HTSUS
subheading 6404.11.80 as covering all athletic footwear “regardless of
whether such athletic footwear bears any similarity to the exemplars
specifically enumerated in the subheading” or are used in the same
96
types of athletic activities.
Second, the Federal Circuit rejected Deckers’ ejusdem generis claim
that the Teva® sandals had the same essential characteristics as the
97
exemplars enumerated under HTSUS subheading 6404.11.80. The
court reasoned that the factual record demonstrated that tennis
shoes, basketball shoes, gym shoes, and training shoes all share a
common design, namely, an “enclosed upper, which contains
features that stabilize the foot, and protect against abrasion and
98
impact.” In contrast, the Teva® sandals “have open toes and open
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1314.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1313.
95. Id. at 1316.
96. Id. at 1315.
97. See id. at 1316 (quoting Airflow Tech., Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287,
1292 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (explaining that for purposes of classifying imported
merchandise, “[t]he principle of ejusdem generis requires anything falling under the
general term ‘or the like’ to possess the same essential characteristic of the specific
enumerated articles”). The court further clarified that “[t]he phrase ‘or the like’
means ‘the same, or very similar to,’” and that “[t]o determine the essential
characteristic, courts may consider attributes such as the purpose, character,
material, design, and texture.” Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1317.
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heels, and lack the features of the named exemplars of
99
6404.11.80. . . .” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit agreed with CBP
and the CIT that the Teva® Sandals were not sufficiently similar to
the types of footwear to which subheading 6404.11.80 referred but,
100
rather, met the plain description of HTSUS subheading 6404.19.35.
101
Finally, in Timber Products Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
addressed an importer’s burden of proof for establishing a
“commercial designation” for tariff classification purposes. This case
involved the importation of certain plywood products from Brazil.
For customs purposes, importers identify plywood based on the
102
species of wood used for the outer ply (or “face” ply).
The
importer, Timber Products Co. (“Timber”), could not identify the
precise species of wood used for the face ply because its suppliers
103
combined multiple species of wood during the production process.
On its invoices and shipping documents, Timber identified the
plywood products as containing different species of woods in the face
ply, such as “Sumauma,” “Faveira,” “Amesclao,” “Brazilian White
104
Rotary,” “White Virola (Virola spp.),” and “Edaiply Faveira.”
Timber claimed that the plywood trade considered “Virola” to be a
commercial designation covering thirty-five different species of wood,
105
including each of these species identified on its entry documents.
Timber further asserted that its articles should be classified under
106
subheading 4412.13.40 of the HTSUS —which carried duty–free

99. See id. (explaining that unlike the exemplars of HTSUS subheading
6404.11.80, the Teva® sandals did not contain an enclosed upper to stabilize the foot
or enclosed toes and heels to protect against abrasion and impact).
100. Id. at 1318.
101. 515 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, No. 07-1136 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16218 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2008).
102. See id. at 1217 (describing plywood as consisting of two outer wooden sheets
called the “face” ply and the “backing,” and one or more middle plies comprising the
“core,” which are pressed together to form the finished plywood product).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1217–18 (citing Timber Prods. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 2d
1342, 1347 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)) (explaining that “‘Virola’ refers to a botanical
genus consisting of approximately 45 to 60 different species of tropical hardwood.
The term ‘Virola spp.’ denotes all species of the genus Virola. ‘Virola’ is also a
commercial term used within the plywood trade”). In contrast, “[t]he terms
‘Sumauma,’ ‘Faveira,’ ‘Edaiply Faveira,’ ‘Amesclao,’ and ‘Brazilian White’ are each
trade or common terms for various species of tropical hardwood from botanical
genera other than ‘Virola.’” Id. at 1218 (citing Timber Prods. Co., 462 F. Supp. 2d at
1347).
106. Subheading 4412.13.40 covers “Plywood, veneered panels and similar
laminated wood; . . . [w]ith at least one outer ply of the following tropical woods:
Dark Red Meranti, Light Red Meranti, White Lauan, Sipo, Limba, Okoume, Obeche,
Acajou d’Afriquee, Sapelli, Virola, Mahogany, Palissandre de Para, Palissandre de Rio
or Palissandre de Rose.” Id. at 1217 n.2 (emphasis added).
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However,
treatment—because it was specific to “Virola” plywood.
CBP disagreed that a commercial designation for “Virola” plywood
existed, and it classified Timber’s products under the more general
HTSUS subheading 4412.14.30 that imposes an ad valorem duty rate
108
of 8 percent.
The CIT upheld CBP’s classification of the merchandise under
HTSUS subheading 4412.14.30, finding that Timber failed to
establish a commercial designation for Virola that applied
109
throughout every trade that imported “Virola” products. On appeal,
the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s decision because the “relevant
trade for analyzing whether a tariff term has an established
commercial meaning is determined by the merchandise before the
court in a particular case, not by all merchandise to which the tariff
110
term might apply.”
Therefore, the court remanded the case with
instructions for the CIT to consider whether Timber had established
a commercial designation for “Virola” within only the plywood trade
and, if so, whether Timber’s imported plywood met the definition of
111
that commercial designation. On remand, the CIT again sustained
CBP’s classification under HTSUS subheading 4412.14.30 after
concluding that Timber had not established a commercial
112
designation for “Virola” specifically within the plywood trade.
Timber again appealed the CIT’s remand determination to the
Federal Circuit, but, this time, the appeals court affirmed the CIT.
The Federal Circuit guided its analysis with prior case law addressing
“commercial designations,” finding that the party alleging the
existence of a commercial designation must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence “a definite, uniform, and general
commercial meaning for a term that is so widespread throughout the
relevant industry that, for tariff purposes, it effectively supersedes the
113
In reviewing the CIT’s legal
common meaning of the term.”
107. Id. at 1218.
108. Id. at 1216 n.1 (citing HTSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1997), subheading
4412.14.30) (explaining that subheading 4412.14.30 covers “[p]lywood, veneered
panels and similar laminated wood; . . . [o]ther, with at least one outer ply of
nonconiferous wood: . . . [o]ther”).
109. Id. at 1218 (citing Timber Prods. Co. v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1241,
1248–51 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004)).
110. Id. (citing Timber Prods. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1198, 1202 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
111. Id. (citing Timber Prods. Co., 417 F.3d at 1203).
112. Id. at 1219 (explaining that “the testimonial and documentary evidence
revealed a commercial meaning for the term [Virola] that was ‘general,’ but neither
‘uniform’ nor ‘definite’”).
113. Id. at 1217 n.3. The Federal Circuit continued that “[t]he concept of
commercial designation ‘was intended to apply to cases where the trade designation
is so universal and well understood that Congress, and all the trade, are supposed to
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conclusions de novo, the court agreed that Timber had failed to
establish a commercial designation for the term “Virola” that was
114
uniform and definite throughout the plywood trade.
At the outset, the Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s claim
that clear congressional intent existed that precluded the CIT from
115
undertaking a commercial designation analysis. Instead, the court
agreed with the CIT that “there was no clear Congressional intent
that would preclude a commercial designation analysis with respect
116
The Federal Circuit then held that the CIT
to the term ‘Virola.’”
did not make any clearly erroneous findings of fact or law with
respect to its conclusion that Timber’s proposed commercial
117
designation was neither uniform nor definite.
First, with respect to uniformity, the court concluded that “the
testimonial and documentary evidence demonstrates that Timber was
unable to establish a commercial designation for ‘Virola’ that was the
118
same throughout the plywood trade,” and that Timber failed to
“prove a widely understood commercial meaning that applies
119
everywhere throughout the relevant industry.” Second, the Federal
Circuit stated that “[i]n order for a commercial designation to be
120
definite, it must be certain of understanding.” The court then held
that the CIT reasonably found that Timber’s proposed “Virola”
designation was not of certain understanding throughout the
plywood trade, as demonstrated by the lack of general consensus
121
among the witnesses and documents presented at trial.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit sustained CBP’s classification of
122
Timber’s entries under HTSUS subheading 4412.14.30.

have been fully acquainted with the practice at the time the law was enacted.’” Id. at
1219 (quoting Jas. Akeroyd & Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. Cust. 440, 443 (1928)).
114. Id. at 1220.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1221–23.
118. Id. at 1221.
119. Id. at 1222.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1222–23.
122. The Federal Circuit also rejected Timber’s claim that one specific entry
containing an article that it identified on the invoice as “White Virola (Virola spp.)”
was entitled to classification under HTSUS subheading 4412.13.40 because Timber
could not substantiate that the face ply actually contained Virola wood. See id. at
1223 (holding that “[i]t is not the invoice but the goods that determine
classification”).
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B. Valuation Issues
Another issue affecting CBP’s administration of the customs laws is
123
the proper appraisal of imported merchandise.
The customs
statute and CBP’s regulations provide that the customs value will
normally be the “transaction value,” which is the “price actually paid
or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation to the
United States,” subject to certain adjustments enumerated under the
124
law. Determining the appropriate entered value is critical because
CBP uses that value to assess duties, taxes, and fees, including the
deposits for estimated antidumping and countervailing duties (if
applicable).
In 2008, the Federal Circuit issued two decisions related to claimed
adjustments to the entered value reported by an importer,
Volkswagen of America, Inc. (“VW”). Both Volkswagen of America, Inc.
125
v. United States appeals (hereinafter referred to as Volkswagen Fed.
Cir. I and Volkswagen Fed. Cir. II) involved the same basic set of facts.
VW imported automobiles into the United States, which CBP
appraised based on the transaction price that VW actually paid at the
126
VW later discovered that many of the
time of importation.
automobiles contained manufacturing and design defects that were
not apparent at the time of importation, and it repaired those defects
pursuant to consumer warranties—after it had already completed the
127
VW then filed protests with
sale to the ultimate U.S. purchaser.
128
CBP claiming that, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 158.12, CBP should
reduce the appraised value by an amount equal to the warranty costs
incurred to repair the defective automobiles and then refund import
129
duties and fees assessed on that portion of the transaction value.
VW also filed protests with CBP challenging the appraised value of
130
automobiles that it expected to repair at a later time.
123. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (2006) (setting forth the guidelines for valuing
imported articles).
124. Id. § 1401a(b). In certain circumstances, the transaction value may not be
appropriate, for example, where the importer and exporter are related parties or
where the importer is unable to ascertain the transaction value. Id. § 1401a(a)(1),
(b)(2).
125. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. I, 532 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Volkswagen Fed. Cir. II,
540 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, No. 07-1518 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25392
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2008).
126. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. II, 540 F.3d at 1327.
127. Id.
128. See 19 C.F.R. § 158.12(a) (2008) (“Merchandise which is subject to ad
valorem or compound duties and found by the port director to be partially damaged
at the time of importation shall be appraised in its condition as imported, with an
allowance made in the value to the extent of the damage.”).
129. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. II, 540 F.3d at 1327–28.
130. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. I, 532 F.3d at 1368.
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After CBP denied each of VW’s claims, the importer commenced
131
an action at the CIT, which made three separate findings. First, the
CIT concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over claims covering repairs
132
that VW made after it filed its protests with CBP.
Second, with
respect to claims based on repairs that VW made before filing its
protests to correct design defects in response to government–
mandated recalls, the CIT held that VW was not entitled to
allowances because VW had ordered automobiles containing design
133
defects. Third, with respect to claims based on pre–protest repairs
to correct defects unrelated to government recalls, the CIT also held
that VW did not establish its entitlement to allowances because it had
provided insufficient evidence to prove that the defects existed at the
134
time of importation. After the CIT denied a motion for rehearing,
VW filed an appeal that became the subject of Volkswagen Fed. Cir.
135
II.
VW subsequently filed claims with CBP requesting that it provide
allowances to the appraised value of automobiles under 19 C.F.R.
§ 158.12 for repairs occurring after the protest period had expired,
136
VW then commenced a separate
which CBP refused to address.
137
action at the CIT under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
138
However, the
and sought jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
CIT dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted based on its conclusions that: (1) 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514—which governs challenges to CBP appraisals—precluded
judicial review under the APA for any claims made after the
expiration of the protest period; and (2) VW could not bring a
separate cause of action under 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 to challenge
139
appraisals for defective merchandise. VW then docketed a second
140
appeal that the Federal Circuit decided in Volkswagen Fed. Cir. I.
131. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. II, 540 F.3d at 1326.
132. Id. at 1328 (citing Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d
1364, 1369 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003)).
133. Id. at 1329–30.
134. Id. at 1329.
135. Id. at 1330.
136. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. I, 532 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the
deadline to file a protest was 90 days from the date of notice of liquidation). In 2004,
Congress amended 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) to extend the protest period from 90 days
to 180 days from the date of liquidation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3), amended by Pub.
L. No. 108-429, § 2103 (Dec. 3, 2004).
137. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (providing that causes of action are available to
persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute”).
138. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. I, 532 F.3d at 1369.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1369.
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In Volkswagen Fed. Cir. I, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s
dismissal for failure to state a claim. After concluding that VW’s
claim for an allowance under 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 actually relied on the
APA for standing purposes, the court held that 19 U.S.C. § 1514
141
It reasoned that VW
precluded judicial review under the APA.
could not circumvent the procedural time limits established by
19 U.S.C. § 1514 merely by bringing a separate cause of action under
19 C.F.R. § 158.12 because nothing in 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 contradicted
142
Thus, according to the
the statutory deadlines for filing protests.
court, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 sets forth the only procedure for bringing a
cause of action for allowances for defects discovered and repaired
143
In a concurring opinion, Senior Circuit Judge
after importation.
Friedman agreed with the court’s legal analysis but expressed
concern about the fact that VW had no recourse under the existing
law to challenge the appraisal of automobiles with latent defects
discovered after the expiration of the protest period, despite
incurring repair costs that would normally reduce the appraised
144
value.
In Volkswagen Fed. Cir. II, the Federal Circuit partially affirmed and
145
partially reversed the CIT with respect to VW’s denied protests.
The court first affirmed the CIT’s ruling that the lower court lacked
jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1) over VW’s claims for
146
automobile repairs completed after the date that it filed its protests.
The court reasoned that protests must “distinctly and specifically”
describe the nature of the merchandise subject to the protest in
order to be considered valid, but VW’s protests failed to do so,
thereby precluding the CIT from obtaining jurisdiction under
147
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
The Federal Circuit next affirmed the CIT with respect to claims
based on pre-protest repairs to correct manufacturing defects other
than recall repairs. The court held that the CIT did not commit any
“clear errors” in concluding that VW had provided insufficient
evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the

141. Id. at 1370.
142. Id. at 1370–71.
143. See id. at 1371 (holding that 19 U.S.C. § 1514 governs claims made under
19 C.F.R. § 158.12 unless a statutory exception applies, but that VW failed to establish
that any of the statutory exceptions existed in its case).
144. Id. at 1374–76.
145. Volkswagen Fed. Cir. II, 540 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
146. Id. at 1331.
147. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1) and 19 C.F.R. § 174.13(a)(5)–(6)).
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The court
defects at issue existed at the time of importation.
observed that VW had supplied only warranty agreements to support
its claim that it made repairs subject to warranties and held that,
“[w]ithout more, [the court] cannot conclude from the mere fact
that Volkswagen made a determination that the repair was covered
under its warranty that the alleged defect existed at the time of
149
importation.”
However, with respect to claims based on pre-protest repairs to
correct design defects in response to government-mandated recalls,
the Federal Circuit disagreed with the CIT’s conclusion that VW had
150
contracted for automobiles containing design defects. Rather, the
importation sales agreements showed that VW had contracted for
151
automobiles free from both design and manufacturing defects.
The court concluded that VW had demonstrated that it made repairs
to correct defects existing at the time of importation to comply with
152
federal safety statutes and recall notices. The court stated that “the
very nature of a government mandated safety recall establishes the
high likelihood that any defects repaired pursuant to the recall
153
existed at the time of importation.” It then held that an importer is
entitled to an allowance under 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 for the costs to
repair latent defects pursuant to a government recall because
evidence of the recall sufficiently demonstrates that the defects
154
existed at the time of importation. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT’s ruling regarding VW’s claimed allowances in
response to government recalls and remanded the issue to determine
whether the recalls at issue covered latent defects that may have
155
existed in VW’s automobiles at the time of importation.
C. Jurisdictional Issues
In 2008, the Federal Circuit decided two customs cases that raised
jurisdictional questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the residual (or
148. Id. at 1333 (quoting Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1359, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2006)) (holding, with respect to a warranty repair claim, that an importer
must “provide[] critically probative evidence that the defects in question actually
existed at importation”).
149. Id. at 1334.
150. Id. at 1335.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1327, 1335–36.
153. Id. at 1336.
154. Id. at 1327.
155. Id. at 1336. The Federal Circuit also held that the CIT did not err in denying
VW’s motion for a rehearing on its claim that 19 U.S.C. § 1401a, which permits
exclusions from entered value for post-importation “maintenance” expenses, entitled
it to relief because VW failed to raise that claim before the CIT. Id. at 1336–37.
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Hartford
“catch-all”) jurisdictional provision under the U.S. Code.
157
Fire Insurance Co. v. United States addressed whether the CIT had
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim filed by a surety regarding the
enforceability of its bonds. CBP assessed antidumping duties on
certain entries of polyethylene carrier bags for which Hartford Fire
158
Insurance (“Hartford”) was the surety. When CBP issued a formal
demand against the surety bonds to pay the antidumping duties,
Hartford filed suit with the CIT claiming that the bonds had been
rendered unenforceable by the Continued Dumping and Subsidy
159
Offset Act of 2000 (“CDSOA”) —a mechanism under which CBP
distributes collected antidumping and countervailing duties to
affected U.S. domestic producers, whereas previously such duties
160
were deposited into the general U.S. treasury. Hartford argued that
the amended law “materially altered its bond agreements, which it
claims required funds paid on the bonds to be distributed to the
161
United States, and not to any individual or company.”
Hartford claimed that the CIT had subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) because that provision confers
jurisdiction to determine the common law surety issue of the
162
enforceability of bonds. However, the CIT ruled that the challenge
actually represented a challenge to a customs charge, which is a
protestable action over which the CIT has jurisdiction pursuant to a
163
separate provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Because Hartford failed to
file a protest with the agency and could not otherwise demonstrate
that the protest remedy was “manifestly inadequate,” the CIT
164
dismissed Hartford’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

156. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (2006) (conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the CIT
over civil actions arising out of U.S. laws providing for: (1) revenue from imports;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or taxes on imports for reasons other than raising revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on imports; or (4) the
administration and enforcement of the international trade laws).
157. 544 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
158. Id. at 1290.
159. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000) (repealed 2006) (commonly referred to as the
“Byrd Amendment”).
160. See discussion infra Part II.E (describing the CDSOA and an appeal the court
decided in 2008).
161. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 544 F.3d at 1290–91 (explaining that Hartford alleged
that “it was not obligated to pay a subsidy to the U.S. domestic industry”).
162. Id. at 1291.
163. Id. (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2007)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006) (“The Court of International
Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the
denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”).
164. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 544 F.3d at 1291.
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Hartford appealed the CIT’s dismissal, arguing that the CIT erred
165
in holding that jurisdiction was available under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT, noting first that the
court has consistently held that a litigant may not invoke jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) if jurisdiction was, or could have been,
available under another subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 unless the
166
other subsection was found to be “manifestly inadequate.”
The
court emphasized that the CIT may look to both the form and
substance of claims in determining whether it has subject matter
167
It then characterized Hartford’s claim regarding the
jurisdiction.
unenforceability of the bonds as “artful pleading” because, in
168
substance, Hartford sought to avoid payment of a customs charge.
The court agreed with the CIT that Hartford could have challenged
the demand for payment of antidumping duties through CBP’s
administrative protest mechanism and then obtained jurisdiction via
169
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) if and when CBP denied the protest. Because
Hartford failed to file a protest within the statutory time limit, CBP’s
demand for payment of duties became final.
Consequently,
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) became unavailable as a
recourse, and the Federal Circuit held that the CIT could not claim
170
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). The court also held that the
protest remedy was not “manifestly inadequate” because CBP “has the
authority to cancel a bond or a charge against a bond in the event of
the breach of any condition of the bond, the ultimate remedy
171
Hartford seeks.”

165. Id. at 1292–93.
166. Id. at 1292. The Federal Circuit further explained that “to prevent
circumvention of the administrative processes crafted by Congress, jurisdiction under
subsection 1581(i) may not be invoked if jurisdiction under another subsection of
section 1581 is or could have been available, unless the other subsection is shown to
be manifestly inadequate.” Id. (citing Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467
F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
167. Id. at 1293 (“Just as we must look to the true nature of the action in a district
court in determining jurisdiction on appeal, the trial court was correct to look to the
true nature of the action in determining jurisdiction at the outset.”).
168. Id. (citations omitted).
169. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3), (c)(3)).
170. Id. The Federal Circuit also rejected Hartford’s claim that CBP does not have
authority to determine the enforceability of bonds. Id. at 1294. It held that CBP
“does have broad authority over the administration and forms of bonds, including
determining their validity and enforceability and a surety’s liability pursuant to the
bonds.” Id. (citing Am. Pillowcase & Lace Co. v. United States, 20 Cust. Ct. 53, 61
(1948)).
171. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1623(c)).
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172

represents another
Sakar International, Inc. v. United States
interesting decision involving a jurisdictional issue. CBP determined
that travel chargers and mini-keyboards for personal digital assistants
(“PDAs”), which Sakar International, Inc. (“Sakar”) imported from
China, were counterfeit because they were marked with certain U.S.
173
trademarks without the trademark owners’ authorization. Pursuant
174
to its authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e)-(f), CBP seized and
subsequently destroyed the merchandise and then imposed civil fines
on Sakar for importing counterfeit goods, stating that the fines
175
In an action that
represented a “final administrative review.”
followed, the CIT agreed with Sakar that CBP’s seizure of the
counterfeit goods constituted an embargo under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e)
because it was tantamount to a governmentally imposed import
176
restriction. The lower court then held that it had jurisdiction over
the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4), as it related to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)(3), which grants the CIT exclusive jurisdiction over the
“administration and enforcement” of embargoes or other
177
quantitative restrictions. However, the CIT ultimately dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
after finding that CBP’s assessment of the civil fine did not constitute
a “final agency action” under the APA because CBP “retained
discretion over the ultimate decision of whether or not to sue Sakar
178
in a district court in order to collect the fine.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s ruling and instead
held that the lower court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
179
the action.
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in K Mart
172. 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, No. 07-1173 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10553 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008), appeal
dismissed, 2008 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 126 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 3, 2008).
173. Id. at 1342.
174. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006) (providing that any “merchandise bearing a
counterfeit mark . . . imported into the United States . . . shall be seized and, in the
absence of the written consent of the trademark owner, forfeited for violations of the
customs laws”); id. § 1526(f)(1) (granting CBP the discretion to impose a civil fine
on “[a]ny person who directs, assists financially or otherwise, or aids and abets the
importation of merchandise for sale or public distribution that is seized under
subsection (e) of this section”).
175. Sakar, 516 F.3d at 1342–43.
176. Id. at 1343.
177. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (2006) (granting the CIT the exclusive
jurisdiction over civil actions involving “embargoes or other quantitative restrictions
on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the
public health or safety”); id. § 1581(i)(4) (conferring jurisdiction to the CIT over
actions involving the “administration and enforcement with respect to the matters
referred to in paragraphs (1)–(3) of” § 1581(i)).
178. Sakar, 516 F.3d at 1344.
179. Id. at 1350.
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180

Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the seizure did not
constitute an embargo under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) because that
provision “does not constitute a governmentally imposed quantitative
limit on importation, because under that provision the trademark
owner, not the government, retains ultimate control over whether or
181
Rather, CBP’s
not the ‘counterfeit’ merchandise is imported.”
seizure represented an “intermediate step in the ultimate disposition
182
of that merchandise” through which “[t]he private party, not the
Government . . . decid[es] whether and how to exercise its private
right [and] determines the quantity of any particular product that
183
can be imported.”
Because the seizure did not constitute an
embargo within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3), and none of
the other statutory bases for jurisdiction existed, the Federal Circuit
184
concluded that the CIT did not have jurisdiction over the matter.
Even though the CIT had already dismissed the action on alternate
grounds, the Federal Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and
remanded it with instructions to dismiss Sakar’s complaint for lack of
185
jurisdiction.
D. Other Customs Issues
Finally, in 2008, the Federal Circuit reviewed two CIT decisions
involving aspects of U.S. customs law other than those described in
186
the foregoing sections. In Nufarm America’s, Inc. v. United States, the
Federal Circuit considered a constitutional challenge to 19 C.F.R.
§ 181.53 concerning CBP’s collection and waiver or reduction of
duties under the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)
duty-deferral programs.
Nufarm America’s, Inc. (“Nufarm”)
imported chemicals into the United States, which it processed into
187
Upon export, CBP
herbicides and then exported to Canada.
assessed a deferred duty on the articles pursuant to 19 C.F.R.
188
Nufarm filed a protest alleging that CBP’s regulation
§ 181.53.

180. 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
181. Sakar, 516 F.3d at 1347 (concluding that, under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a), no
embargo exists where a governmental restriction “merely provides a mechanism by
which a private party might, at its own option, enlist the government’s aid in
restricting the quantity of imports in order to enforce a private right . . . .”) (quoting
K Mart Corp., 485 U.S. at 185).
182. Id. at 1348.
183. Id. at 1347 (citing K Mart Corp., 485 U.S. at 185).
184. Id. at 1348–49.
185. Id. at 1350.
186. 521 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 569 (2008).
187. Id. at 1367.
188. Id. The Code of Federal Regulations explains:
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violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution—which provides
that “[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
189
State” —because the regulation defers import duties on articles
imported for repair, alteration, or processing until the articles are
exported to NAFTA countries and, thus, constituted an illegal duty
190
After CBP denied Nufarm’s protest and the CIT
on exports.
subsequently granted summary judgment to the Government,
191
Nufarm filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s ruling that 19 C.F.R.
§ 181.53 did not violate the Export Clause because it imposes duties
192
on imports, and not on exports. The court held that the regulation
on its face expressly “imposes an import duty, but postpones its
193
collection until the time of export.”
Thus, the regulation did not
violate the Constitution because it imposed an import tax assessed, in
194
Furthermore, the
part, on the amount “payable on importation.”
regulation as applied did not violate the Constitution because the
liability for paying the duty attached at the time of importation but
195
The
with collection deferred until the time of exportation.
regulation requiring importers to identify the date of exportation on
the CBP entry summary and to pay the duties within sixty days after
exportation did not somehow transform the import duties into an
export tax or otherwise render the regulation as applied
196
unconstitutional, the court concluded.
197
United States v. National Semiconductor Corp. represents the Federal
Circuit’s second decision in an action concerning the imposition of
penalties and prejudgment interest on an importer, National
Semiconductor Corporation (“NSC”), for underpayment of

Where a good is imported into the United States pursuant to a duty-deferral
program and is subsequently withdrawn from the duty-deferral program and
entered into a duty-deferral program in Canada or Mexico . . . the withdrawn
good shall be subject to duty which shall be assessed in accordance with
paragraph (b) of this section.
19 C.F.R. § 181.53(a)(ii)(2)(B) (2008).
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
190. Nufarm America’s, Inc., 521 F.3d at 1367–68.
191. Id. at 1367.
192. Id. at 1369. Nufarm also challenged the CIT’s denial of class certification to
include all individuals who paid duties under 19 C.F.R. § 181.53, but the Federal
Circuit dismissed that claim as moot in light of its determination that the regulation
is constitutional. Id. at 1370–71.
193. Id. at 1369.
194. Id. at 1370.
195. Id. (noting that “the regulation merely postpones collection of the import
duty until the time of export”).
196. Id.
197. 547 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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merchandise processing fees on entries of integrated circuits and
198
related articles. After NSC voluntarily disclosed the underpayment,
CBP accepted the tender of unpaid fees but still imposed penalties, as
permitted under 19 U.S.C. § 1592, after finding that NSC’s
199
underpayments resulted from negligence. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1592,
when an importer voluntarily discloses to CBP a violation caused by
its negligence or gross negligence, CBP may impose penalties but
rewards the importer by capping the penalty amount to “the interest
(computed from the date of liquidation at the prevailing rate of
interest . . .) on the amount of lawful duties, taxes, and fees of which
200
the United States is or may be deprived . . . .”
In NSC’s case, the
maximum penalty permitted under 19 U.S.C. § 1592, which CBP
201
imposed, totaled $250,840.
CBP subsequently commenced an action at the CIT to collect the
202
After considering the fourteen factors cited in
penalty amount.
203
United States v. Complex Machine Works Co.
regarding the
establishment of monetary penalties for customs violations, the CIT
awarded CBP compensatory interest of $250,840 for the
204
underpayments pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c), plus a penalty
205
In the first
award of $10,000 pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4).
198. Id. at 1366.
199. Id.
200. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4)(B) (2006).
201. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 547 F.3d at 1366.
202. Id. at 1366–67.
203. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1315 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999). The court identified the
following fourteen factors for determining penalty awards under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1592(c)(4)(B):
[T]he defendant’s good faith effort to comply with the statute; (2) the
degree of culpability; (3) the defendant’s history of previous violations; (4)
the nature of the public interest in ensuring compliance with the regulations
involved; (5) the nature and circumstances of the violation at issue; (6) the
gravity of the violation; (7) the defendant’s ability to pay; (8) the
appropriateness of the size of the penalty to the defendant’s business and
the effect of the penalty on the defendant’s ability to continue doing
business; (9) that the penalty not otherwise be shocking to the conscience of
the Court; (10) the economic benefit gained by the defendant through the
violation; (11) the degree of harm to the public; (12) the value of
vindicating the agency authority; (13) whether the party sought to be
protected by the statute had been adequately compensated for the harm,
and (14) such other matters as justice may require.
Id.
204. See 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) (2006) (providing that “[i]nterest assessed due to an
underpayment of duties, fees, or interest shall accrue, at a rate determined by the
Secretary, from the date the importer of record is required to deposit estimated
duties, fees, and interest to the date of liquidation or reliquidation of the applicable
entry or reconciliation.”).
205. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 547 F.3d at 1366–67 (citing United States v. Nat’l
Semiconductor Corp., 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1929, 2006 WL 1663279, at *6 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2006)).
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appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s award of compensatory
interest to CBP pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) and remanded the
case with instructions that the CIT reconsider the penalty amount
206
In its remand determination, the
under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4).
CIT reevaluated the Complex Machine Works factors and awarded CBP
the maximum available penalty possible under 19 U.S.C.
207
§ 1592(c)(4)(B), $250,840, plus prejudgment interest thereon.
NSC subsequently appealed the remand determination to the
Federal Circuit, claiming that the CIT abused its discretion by
awarding CBP the maximum available penalty and by awarding
208
prejudgment interest.
The court affirmed the CIT’s decision to
award CBP the maximum penalty for the negligent violations, but it
reversed the lower court’s award of prejudgment interest on the
209
penalty.
The Federal Circuit first concluded that the CIT did not
commit error or otherwise abuse its discretion by awarding the
maximum penalty because, contrary to NSC’s claim, the CIT did not
210
base its remand analysis on any single factor.
Rather, the CIT
found that at least six of the fourteen factors under the Complex
211
Machine Works framework weighed against mitigating the penalty.
The court further concluded that nothing in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1592(c)(4)(B) limited the CIT’s authority to grant the maximum
212
penalty for negligent violations.
However, the Federal Circuit next held that the CIT abused its
discretion in awarding prejudgment interest on the 19 U.S.C.
213
§ 1592(c)(4)(B) penalty award.
The court explained that its
precedent supported the position that “[p]rejudgment interest may
214
not be awarded on punitive damages.” It continued that the plain
language of the statute clearly indicated that the “maximum
penalties” allowable under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c) are punitive in nature

206. Id. at 1367 (citing United States v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 496 F.3d 1354,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1368 (“An award of prejudgment interest is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.”) (citing United States v. Reul, 959 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
209. Id. at 1371.
210. Id. at 1368 (describing NSC’s assertion that the CIT based its award on a
single factor under the Complex Machine Works test, namely, compensating the
government for lost interest).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1369 (“Section 1592(c)(4)(B) provides the same maximum penalty for
both negligent and grossly negligent violations, but does not provide additional
guidance on how the court is to determine the penalty in a given case.”).
213. Id. at 1370.
214. Id. at 1369 (quoting United States v. Reul, 959 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
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The court
because they are designed to deter future violations.
then held that the penalty amount remained uncertain prior to the
CIT’s final decision because the CIT itself, and not CBP, determined
216
the penalty amount. It explained that the CIT improperly awarded
prejudgment interest because “[u]ncertainty in the amount of a
217
In other
claim is a ground for denying prejudgment interest.”
words, the Federal Circuit’s decision here favors importers because it
stands for the proposition that the CIT may not award prejudgment
interest on top of monetary penalties that CBP imposes in response
to voluntary disclosures.
II. TRADE REMEDIES LAWS
218

“Commerce among nations should be fair and equitable.”
U.S.
law seeks to establish a “fair and equitable” playing field for U.S.
industries through the trade remedies laws, which impose tariffs on
imported products as a form of relief for injury caused by the
practices of dumping and subsidization. Under the antidumping
laws, the United States will impose a tariff on imported goods if it
determines that foreign exporters are selling their merchandise in
the U.S. market at prices that are “less than . . . fair value,” i.e., less
than the price at which the same or similar merchandise is sold in the
219
exporters’ home market or a comparable third-country market.
The countervailing duty laws impose duties on imported products
where the United States concludes that a foreign government or
other public entity has directly or indirectly subsidized the
220
merchandise imported into the U.S. market.
Congress bifurcated the responsibilities for conducting U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. Commerce,
through
its
International
Trade
Administration,
Import
Administration, is charged with determining whether producers or
exporters from foreign countries are engaged in these unfair trade
practices. Concurrent with Commerce’s investigations, the ITC
focuses on the domestic industry that made the dumping or subsidy
allegations and determines whether that industry is being materially
injured or threatened with material injury by imports from the
215. Id. at 1369–70 (citations omitted).
216. Id. at 1370.
217. Id. (quoting Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 38 F.3d 1200, 1202 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
218. Benjamin Franklin, Inscription, 15th Street Entrance, United States
Department of Commerce Building, Washington, D.C.
219. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2006).
220. Id. § 1671.
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221

Thus, an investigation
foreign country (or countries) in question.
commences with the filing of a petition by a domestic industry at
both agencies. If, through their investigations, both agencies make
affirmative findings—that is, if Commerce determines that dumping
or subsidization has occurred and the ITC determines that the
dumping or subsidization has materially injured or threatened
material injury to the domestic industry—the United States will
impose definitive antidumping or countervailing duties on imports of
222
the products under investigation from the subject countries.
The antidumping or countervailing duty rates that Commerce
determines during the investigation phase are only estimates of the
actual liability of an importer on the particular entry. As a result of
the investigations, Commerce instructs CBP to “suspend liquidation”
on entries of merchandise covered by an antidumping or
countervailing duty proceeding and to collect estimated duties at the
antidumping or countervailing duty rates determined during the
223
Suspension of liquidation in this context
investigation phase.
means that CBP delays final review of an entry, including the
determination of the actual rate and amount of duties owed, until
after the completion of an administrative review. Thus, the estimated
duties paid at the time of entry serve as security deposits for the
amounts that the importers may ultimately owe. In each year
following the anniversary of the antidumping or countervailing duty
order, Commerce may initiate an administrative review—upon
request by an exporter, importer, domestic producer, or (in a
224
countervailing duty case) foreign governments —and determine the
225
If an
actual duty liability for entries during the prior year.
exporter’s entries are not reviewed, then its final liability for duties

221. Id. § 1673(2)(A).
222. See generally id. §§ 1671, 1673 (noting the general criteria necessary for the
imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties). Although it may find the
existence of dumping or subsidization, Commerce may only issue an antidumping or
countervailing order, as appropriate, upon an affirmative finding of injury by the
ITC. Id.
223. Id. §§ 1671d(c)(1), 1673d(c)(1); see 19 C.F.R. § 351.210(d) (2008)
(describing CBP’s collection process pursuant to Commerce’s instruction following
an affirmative final determination).
224. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(b) (2008) (identifying the parties that have standing
to request administrative reviews). Unlike Commerce, the ITC does not conduct
annual reviews of its injury determination.
225. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(C) (2006) (describing the conditions by which
Commerce determines the actual duty liabilities); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.221(b)(6)
(2008) (stating that CBP is to promptly assess duties after Commerce publishes its
final results of administrative review).
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226

equals the amount that it deposited. If an exporter does participate
in an administrative review, then its final liability for antidumping or
countervailing duties may be more or less than the amount
deposited, depending on the outcome of the review. At the
conclusion of each administrative review, Commerce instructs CBP to
lift the suspension of liquidation and assess antidumping or
countervailing duties for each reviewed exporter’s entries during the
review period at the final rates determined in the administrative
review (unless liquidation becomes enjoined pursuant to a courtordered injunction). This process continues every year in the
anniversary month of the order to permit review of all U.S. entries or
sales of subject merchandise that occur during the time in which the
antidumping or countervailing duty order remains in effect.
A. Procedural Issues in Antidumping Proceedings
In 2008, the Federal Circuit decided three cases arising out of
antidumping proceedings in which it resolved questions of civil
procedure and did not actually reach the merits of the substantive
issues. In each case, the Federal Circuit vacated or reversed at least
part of the CIT’s ruling.
227
In Gerdau Ameristeel Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit held
that a plaintiff’s appeal of a Commerce determination had not been
rendered moot by the plaintiff’s failure to seek an injunction to
enjoin liquidation of the entries covered by the underlying
administrative review where a live controversy existed beyond the
liquidation of entries for which the courts could provide relief. The
underlying proceeding involved an antidumping duty order against
228
steel concrete reinforcing bars (“rebar”) from Turkey. In the fifth
administrative review of the order, Commerce calculated a de
minimis antidumping duty rate of less than 0.5 percent for
respondent ICDAS Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim Sanayi, A.S.
(“ICDAS”)—meaning that, for purposes of the antidumping laws,
229
ICDAS did not dump its rebar during the applicable review period.
In the sixth administrative review, which was the subject of the Gerdau
226. See id. § 351.212(c) (providing that Commerce will instruct CBP to
“automatically assess” antidumping or countervailing duties if no review is requested
of an exporter at the deposit rates in effect at the time of entry).
227. 519 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
228. Id. at 1337.
229. Id. at 1337–38 (citing Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Turkey,
68 Fed. Reg. 53,127, 53,128 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 9, 2003) (final admin. review));
see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c) (establishing that a weighted-average dumping margin
is considered “de minimis” in an administrative review if it is less than 0.5 percent ad
valorem).
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case, Commerce again calculated a de minimis rate for ICDAS.
Under Commerce’s regulations, if ICDAS obtained a third
consecutive de minimis rate in the seventh administrative review—
which it ultimately did—then it became eligible for revocation from
231
If revoked from the antidumping
the antidumping duty order.
duty order, ICDAS’s entries after the effective date of revocation
would no longer be subject to suspension of liquidation or
antidumping duty deposit requirements.
Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation (“Gerdau”), a domestic producer
that benefited from the continued imposition of antidumping duties
against ICDAS, filed an action with the CIT challenging various
aspects of Commerce’s calculation methodology in the final results of
232
Commerce’s sixth administrative review.
Typically, when a party
challenges the outcome of an administrative review determination, it
will seek a preliminary injunction to enjoin liquidation of the entries
covered by the administrative review so that, if it prevails, the results
233
of the litigation can be applied to those entries. However, Gerdau
did not move to enjoin ICDAS’s entries during the sixth review
period, explaining that its goal in the appeal was to obtain on
remand an above de minimis rate for ICDAS that would, in turn,
preclude ICDAS from obtaining the three consecutive de minimis
rates necessary to qualify for partial revocation from the antidumping
234
duty order.
CBP consequently liquidated ICDAS’s entries during
235
236
the sixth review period. Citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,
where the Federal Circuit held that the liquidation of entries prior to
decisions on the merits deprives a plaintiff of its “statutory right to
237
obtain judicial review of [an antidumping] determination,” the CIT
held that the appeal had been rendered moot because the
230. Gerdau, 519 F.3d at 1337 (citing Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars
from Turkey, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,731, 64,733 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 8, 2004) (final
admin. review)).
231. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.222 (2008) (providing that an individual producer or
exporter is entitled to revocation, in part, of an antidumping duty order if it:
(1) demonstrates that it has not engaged in dumping for at least three consecutive
review periods; (2) agrees in writing to the immediate reinstatement of the order if
Commerce later concludes that the producer or exporter has resumed dumping;
and (3) demonstrates that the continued application of the order against it is no
longer necessary).
232. Gerdau, 519 F.3d at 1338–39.
233. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2) (2000) (authorizing the CIT to enjoin the
liquidation of entries subject to a Commerce or ITC proceeding if an interested
party requests injunctive relief and demonstrates that injunctive relief is warranted).
234. Gerdau, 519 F.3d at 1339.
235. Id.
236. 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
237. Id. at 810.
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liquidation of ICDAS’s entries had eliminated the only remedy
available to Gerdau, and it dismissed the action for lack of subject
238
matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s dismissal and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
The court first
explained that, under the mootness doctrine, a live “case or
239
It next
controversy” must exist at all stages of the litigation.
clarified that its prior holding in the Zenith case “did not establish a
blanket rule that there can never be a post-liquidation review of an
administrative review determination, even when that determination
240
affects matters other than the specific liquidated goods.” Rather, if
the challenged aspects of an antidumping duty determination have
future consequences for substantive issues other than the liquidation
of entries, then a live controversy exists for which the courts can
241
The Federal Circuit concluded that Gerdau had
provide relief.
demonstrated that a live controversy existed because the de minimis
rate in the sixth review impacted ICDAS’s ability to seek revocation in
the seventh review and, therefore, it held that the CIT erred in
242
dismissing Gerdau’s action.
The Federal Circuit resolved another procedural issue involving
revocation of an antidumping duty order when, in Tokyo Kikai
243
Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, it recognized Commerce’s inherent
authority to reconsider the results of an antidumping duty
administrative review that had been tainted by fraud. In the
underlying antidumping proceeding of large newspaper printing
presses (“LNPPs”) from Japan, Commerce partially revoked the order
with respect to respondent Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. and TKS
(U.S.A.), Inc. (collectively “TKS”) after determining that the
company had not engaged in dumping for three consecutive

238. Gerdau, 519 F.3d at 1339.
239. Id. at 1340 (citing U.S. CONST., art. III).
240. Id. at 1341.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1341–42. The Federal Circuit also dismissed the Government’s claim
that Gerdau lacked jurisdiction to challenge aspects of Commerce’s sixth
administrative review determination as they pertained to partial revocation of the
antidumping duty order because revocation was not possible until the seventh
administrative review. Id. at 1342. The court reasoned that the statute permits
judicial review for challenges against “any factual findings or legal conclusions upon
which [Commerce’s antidumping] determination is based,” including the
calculation of antidumping duty margins calculated in an administrative review. Id.
(citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(2)).
243. 529 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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244

Commerce later revoked the
administrative review periods.
antidumping duty order in its entirety through a five-year “sunset
245
because the sole domestic interested party, Goss
review”
International Corporation (“Goss”), did not express an interest in the
order’s continued application, as the statute and Commerce’s
246
regulations require.
Sometime later, TKS became involved in a federal civil action
during which it revealed that it had supplied Commerce with false
247
This
information regarding a “secret rebate” to a U.S. customer.
rebate directly impacted the calculation of TKS’s antidumping duty
rate during one of the three administrative reviews forming the basis
248
Upon learning this, Commerce selfof its revocation application.
initiated a “changed circumstances review” through which it
concluded that TKS had provided false information during the
administrative review at issue and assigned the company an
249
antidumping duty rate of 59.67 percent for that review. Commerce
then reinstated the antidumping duty order with respect to TKS
because the company no longer had three consecutive de minimis
250
Commerce further stated its intention to reopen and
rates.
reconsider the five-year sunset review that had led to the total
251
revocation of the order on LNPPs from Japan.

244. Id. at 1356 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b) and Large Newspaper Printing
Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Japan,
67 Fed. Reg. 2,190, 2,191–92 (Dep’t Commerce Jan. 16, 2002) (final admin. review)).
245. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2006) (providing that, every five years after the
publication of an antidumping or countervailing duty order, Commerce will review
the order to determine whether revocation of the order would likely lead to a
continuation or recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy, and the ITC
will review the order to determine whether revocation would likely lead to a
continuation or recurrence of material injury to the domestic industry). If either
Commerce or the ITC issues a negative determination during their respective fiveyear sunset reviews, then Commerce will revoke the applicable order. Id.
246. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 529 F.3d at 1356–57 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(3)(A);
19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(1)(iii)(B)(3); Large Newspaper Printing Presses and
Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Japan (A-588-837)
and Germany (A-428-821), 67 Fed. Reg. 8,522, 8,523 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 19,
2002) (final sunset review)).
247. Id. at 1357.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1357–58 (citing Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components
Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Japan, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,590,
11,591 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 8, 2006) (final changed circ. review)); see also
19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (2006) (authorizing Commerce to conduct reviews of
antidumping or countervailing duty determinations upon receipt of information
from an interested party that shows “changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a
review of such determination”).
250. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 529 F.3d at 1358.
251. Id.
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In response to a complaint filed by TKS, the CIT first held that
Commerce had the “inherent authority” to conduct a changed
circumstances review and reconsider the results of an antidumping
252
duty determination based on allegations of fraud. It then held that
Commerce’s decision to reopen and reconsider the sunset review was
ripe for judicial review but that Commerce lacked the authority to
253
The Government and
reconsider its sunset review determination.
Goss appealed the CIT’s second holding regarding ripeness to the
Federal Circuit, while TKS cross-appealed the CIT’s first holding
regarding Commerce’s authority to reconsider its administrative
254
review determination through a changed circumstance review.
With respect to Commerce’s authority to reconsider its
administrative review determinations, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CIT’s holding that Commerce “possessed inherent authority to
reconsider” the results of its administrative reviews based on
255
allegations of fraud.
It first reiterated the longstanding principles
of administrative law that “administrative agencies possess inherent
authority to reconsider their decisions, subject to certain limitations,
regardless of whether they possess explicit statutory authority to do
256
so,” and that “[a]n agency’s power to consider is even more
fundamental when . . . it is exercised to protect the integrity of its
257
own proceedings from fraud.”
The court then observed that
nothing in the statute precluded Commerce from reconsidering its
previously conducted administrative review in light of allegations of
fraud and that the statute did not prescribe any procedures for
258
Thus, the court held that the
conducting such redeterminations.
CIT “correctly ruled that Commerce, under the circumstances
presented, acted within its inherent authority to protect the integrity
of its proceedings from fraud . . . within a reasonable time after
259
learning of the fraud,” and it affirmed the CIT’s holding on this
issue.
252. Id. (citing Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 2d
1349, 1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
253. Id. (citing Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 1360).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1364.
256. Id. at 1360 (citing Macktal v. Chao, 286 F.3d 822, 825–26 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
257. Id. at 1361 (citing Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9, 12
(2d Cir. 1981)).
258. Id. The Federal Circuit did caveat that the statutory changed circumstances
provisions under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1) did not expressly authorize the type of
changed circumstances review that Commerce conducted in the underlying
proceeding and, therefore, Commerce should not have labeled its reconsideration as
a “changed circumstances review.” Id. at 1361–62.
259. Id.
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However, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s holding regarding
the ripeness of Commerce’s stated intention to reopen and
260
The court explained that an issue
reconsider the sunset review.
becomes ripe for judicial review only if it is “fit for judicial decision”
and withholding judicial consideration would cause the parties
261
It then concluded that Commerce’s stated
undue hardship.
intention to reopen the sunset review did not constitute a final
agency action because it “neither ‘mark[s] the consummation . . . of
the decisionmaking process’ nor defines rights or obligations with
262
respect to TKS or causes legal consequences to flow.” Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit held that the appeal was not ripe for judicial
review because Commerce’s stated intention did not represent a final
agency action but, rather, was merely an open-ended statement that
the agency could theoretically reverse, and deferring judicial
263
consideration would not impose undue hardships on the parties.
264
Finally, in Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee v. United States, the
Federal Circuit addressed the CIT’s authority to review a final
determination concerning the products covered by the “scope” of an
antidumping proceeding. When a domestic industry files a petition
seeking the imposition of antidumping duties, it must include in that
petition a detailed description of the imported products against
265
which it seeks relief—referred to as the “scope” of the proceeding.
The scope must be defined clearly so that Commerce and CBP can
efficiently administer the antidumping duty proceeding by
determining which products are subject to duty deposit requirements
upon entry into the United States and to reporting to Commerce in
the context of its investigations and administrative reviews. In
circumstances where questions as to product coverage arise,
Commerce must determine whether a particular product is included
266
Commerce’s scope definition also
or excluded from the scope.
260. Id. at 1362.
261. Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
262. Id. at 1363 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 152, 177–78 (1997)).
263. Id. at 1364.
264. 515 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, No. 07-1230 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12725 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 28, 2008).
265. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.202(b)(5) (2008) (requiring that petitioning industries
include within an antidumping or countervailing duty petition “[a] detailed
description of the subject merchandise that defines the requested scope of the
investigation, including the technical characteristics and uses of the merchandise
and its current U.S. tariff classification number”). The same rules regarding scope
definition apply equally to countervailing duty proceedings.
266. See generally id. § 351.225 (prescribing the rules and procedures for
determining whether a particular product is covered by the scope of an antidumping
or countervailing duty proceeding).
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guides the analysis that the ITC undertakes to determine whether
dumped imports have caused, or threaten to cause, material injury to
the domestic industry.
In the antidumping proceeding on appeal, the domestic industry
filed a petition against six countries that produced and exported
267
The petition’s proposed
frozen and canned warmwater shrimp.
scope language covered all frozen and canned warmwater shrimp,
but expressly excluded “breaded” shrimp and certain other
268
In the final determination of that investigation, and in
products.
response to arguments raised by certain respondent parties,
Commerce determined that the term “breaded” shrimp also included
“dusted” shrimp—which is an intermediate product dedicated to the
production of breaded shrimp—and, thus, Commerce clarified that
269
the scope of the case excluded dusted shrimp. The ITC also relied
on Commerce’s final scope definition, which excluded dusted
shrimp, in determining that the domestic industry had been
materially injured by reason of dumped imports of frozen warmwater
270
Because Commerce made
shrimp from the six subject countries.
an affirmative finding of dumping and the ITC made an affirmative
injury
determination,
Commerce
subsequently
published
antidumping duty orders against the six countries in which it
271
reiterated the scope language that excluded dusted shrimp.
The petitioner in the underlying proceeding, the Ad Hoc Shrimp
Trade Action Committee (“Committee”), commenced an action at
the CIT challenging Commerce’s decision to exclude dusted shrimp
from the scope. In its complaint, the Committee requested that the
CIT order Commerce to rescind its scope exclusion of dusted shrimp
and instruct Commerce to amend its antidumping duty orders to
267. Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm., 515 F.3d at 1376.
268. Id. at 1377 (citing Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from
Brazil, Ecuador, India, Thailand, the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, 69 Fed. Reg. 3,876, 3,877 (Dep’t Commerce Jan. 27, 2005)
(initiation)).
269. Id. (describing dusted shrimp as “shrimp coated with a light layer of flour . . .
used as an intermediate to making the already excluded breaded shrimp . . . .”).
Commerce similarly included “battered” shrimp in the definition of “breaded”
shrimp because it too constituted an intermediate product used to produce breaded
shrimp. Id. However, the plaintiff-appellant limited its challenge to Commerce’s
scope determination to the treatment of dusted shrimp. Id.
270. Id. at 1378. The ITC determined that canned warmwater shrimp did not
cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic industry, which resulted in
the exclusion of canned shrimp from the final scope language. Id. at 1378, n.4
(citing Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the People’s Republic of China, 70
Fed. Reg. 5,149, 5,152 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (amended final
determination and antidumping duty order)).
271. Id.
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272

include dusted shrimp within the scope definition. The CIT ruled
that it had subject matter jurisdiction to review Commerce’s final
scope determination, but sua sponte dismissed the Committee’s
complaint based on its conclusion that it did not have the authority
to order the specific remedy that the Committee had requested, i.e.,
273
The CIT premised its
amendments to the antidumping orders.
dismissal on three separate holdings: (1) it did not have authority to
order Commerce to revise its antidumping duty orders; (2) the
Committee failed to request any relief other than revising the orders;
and (3) the CIT had no power to order a remand even if one had
been requested because the Committee never appealed the ITC’s
274
final determination.
The Committee appealed all three grounds upon which the CIT
dismissed the Committee’s action—interestingly, with some support
from Commerce, which agreed that the Federal Circuit should
remand the case to the CIT for further proceedings on the merits of
275
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
the dusted shrimp exclusion.
lower court on the first ground, but, in a sternly worded decision,
vacated the CIT’s holding with respect to the second and third
grounds. First, the Federal Circuit agreed that the CIT lacked the
authority to order Commerce to amend its antidumping orders to
include dusted shrimp because the statute precludes Commerce from
issuing orders against products for which the ITC has not made an
276
affirmative injury finding, as was the case with dusted shrimp.
Thus, the court held that the CIT could not order Commerce to
revise the antidumping orders to include dusted shrimp because the
277
ITC never made an affirmative injury finding for that product.
Second, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT erroneously
concluded that the Committee sought only amendment of the
278
antidumping orders as a form of relief. Rather, the Committee had
requested the lower court to remand Commerce’s final scope
determination for reconsideration based on the Committee’s claim
that the dusted shrimp scope exclusion was unsupported by
279
substantial evidence. The court held that the Committee’s request

272. Id. at 1379.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1380 (citing Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 473
F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1337 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
275. Id. at 1375.
276. Id. at 1381.
277. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1381–82.
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for a remand did not depend on its separate request that the CIT
280
instruct Commerce to amend its antidumping orders.
Third, the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s holding—that it
lacked the authority to remand Commerce’s final scope
determination—to the extent that it held the determination to be
281
unsupported by substantial evidence. The court held that 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(ii) expressly grants the CIT the power to review
final scope determinations made by Commerce and that nothing in
the statute bars the CIT from considering such challenges if they are
282
made against Commerce and not the ITC.
The Federal Circuit
next admonished the CIT for holding that the lower court lacked the
authority to remand Commerce’s final scope determination because
“doing so ‘might well prove to be a useless exercise’ if the ITC
283
refused to act voluntarily to modify its final injury determination.”
Rejecting the CIT’s rationale, the court declared that a “federal court
cannot avoid ruling on the legality of a government action when
review of the action is otherwise properly before the court simply
because there is no guarantee that fixing the error will change the
284
ultimate result.” It then explicated that:
The statute provides . . . [the Committee] with a right to appeal not
only a final antidumping order, but also the exclusion of certain
products from Commerce’s final determination. If the exclusion
of dusted shrimp was not supported by substantial evidence or was
otherwise legally erroneous, . . . [the Committee has] a right to
have the final determination remanded to the agency to correct
the error, irrespective of the fact that ITC action will also be
necessary before the antidumping order itself can be amended. To
hold otherwise would nullify the clear statutory command that
Commerce’s final scope determinations are independently
285
reviewable in federal court.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s holding and
remanded the case to the lower court to address the merits of

280. Id. at 1382.
281. Id.
282. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(ii)) (providing interested parties with
the right to judicial review of a final antidumping duty determination by Commerce
or the ITC related to product exclusions).
283. Id. (citing Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 473 F.
Supp. 2d 1336, 1338 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
284. Id. at 1382–83.
285. Id. at 1383. The Federal Circuit also concluded that the Committee could
not commence an action against the ITC for excluding dusted shrimp because “the
ITC has no independent authority to expand the scope of an antidumping
investigation.” Id. at 1384.
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Commerce’s exclusion of dusted shrimp from the scope of its final
286
determination.
B. Deemed Liquidation Issues
Commerce and the ITC are responsible for conducting
antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings to determine
whether dumping or subsidization has occurred (Commerce) and
whether dumped or subsidized imports have injured a domestic
industry (ITC), but the responsibility for administering the actual
287
collection of those duties falls under CBP’s jurisdiction. In recent
years, the Federal Circuit has considered numerous challenges
involving CBP’s liquidation of imported merchandise subject to
antidumping and countervailing duties, including legal questions
288
concerning the “deemed liquidation” rules.
Under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1504(a), an entry is “deemed liquidated” by operation of law at the
rate of duty declared at the time of entry if the entry is not liquidated
289
If liquidation has been
within one year from the date of entry.
suspended either by operation of statute—as is the case with entries
of merchandise subject to antidumping or countervailing duty
orders—or by court order, then 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) provides that
entries are deemed liquidated at the entered rate if they have not
been liquidated within six months after the lifting of suspension of

286. Id. at 1384–85.
287. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (noting that CBP has a “ministerial role” in the assessment of
antidumping and countervailing duties based on Commerce’s instructions).
288. See, e.g., Koyo Corp. of U.S.A. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(holding that deemed liquidation does not eliminate an importer’s right of protest);
SKF USA v. United States, 246 F. App’x 692 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (vacating and
remanding a CIT decision because deemed liquidation had rendered the case
moot); Int’l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(concluding that the deemed liquidation period for an entry commences when
Commerce publishes the final results of the applicable administrative review in the
Federal Register); Cemex S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that domestic interested parties “have no specific avenue of relief for
improper liquidation[s]”); Int’l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1277
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that publication of the final results of an administrative
review in the Federal Register represents “unambiguous and public” notice to CBP of
the lifting of suspension of liquidation).
289. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (2006). Specifically, the statute provides:
Unless an entry is . . . suspended as required by statute or court order, except
as provided in section 1675(a)(3) of this title, an entry of merchandise not
liquidated within one year from: (1) the date of entry of such merchandise;
(2) the date of the final withdrawal of all such merchandise covered by a
warehouse entry; . . . shall be deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, value,
quantity, and amount of duties asserted at the time of entry by the importer
of record.
Id.
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290

In 2008, the Federal Circuit reviewed two appeals of
liquidation.
CIT holdings that invoked the deemed liquidation statute, with
291
markedly different outcomes.
292
In U.S. Tsubaki, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit addressed
whether the older or newer version of the deemed liquidation statute
applied to an importer’s entries. The importer, U.S. Tsubaki, Inc.
(“Tsubaki”), made fifty-six entries of roller chains from Japan
between 1979 and 1983 that were subject to an antidumping duty
293
Thus, CBP (then, the U.S. Customs Service) suspended
order.
liquidation on these entries. At the time of the entries, the roller
chains were subject to a zero percent antidumping duty rate and,
therefore, Tsubaki was not required to pay any cash deposits for
294
estimated antidumping duties.
Subsequently, Commerce
conducted two antidumping duty administrative reviews covering
Tsubaki’s roller chain entries during the 1979–83 period to
295
determine the actual antidumping duty liability. In 1986 and 1987,
Commerce published its final results of review in which it calculated
positive antidumping duty margins for Tsubaki’s entries, meaning
296
that Tsubaki actually owed antidumping duties on them. Although
Commerce’s notices of final results meant that suspension of
liquidation had been lifted and also placed CBP on notice that the
suspension of liquidation had been lifted, CBP did not actually
liquidate the entries until sometime during 2000-01 (i.e., more than
thirteen years after the lifting of suspension of liquidation), at which
297
time it sent Tsubaki a bill for the antidumping duties due.

290. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2006). The statute provides:
[W]hen a suspension required by statute or court order is removed, the
Customs Service shall liquidate the entry . . . within 6 months after receiving
notice of the removal from the Department of Commerce . . . . Any entry . . .
not liquidated by the Customs Service within 6 months after receiving such
notice shall be treated as having been liquidated at the rate of duty, value,
quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the time of entry by the importer of
record.
Id.
291. The deemed liquidation statute technically falls under the category of
“customs laws.” Because these cases discuss substantive aspects of antidumping duty
procedures and relate to the administration of the United States’ trade remedies
laws, this discussion has been included among the trade remedies cases.
292. 512 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. (citing Roller Chain, Other than Bicycle, from Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,425
(Dep’t Commerce May 8, 1987) (final admin. review); Roller Chain, Other than
Bicycle, from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,755 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 4, 1986) (final
admin. review)).
297. United States Tsubaki, Inc., 512 F.3d at 1332.
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Tsubaki filed a protest asserting that the entries had been deemed
liquidated at the entered rate of zero percent pursuant to the
amended version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) enacted in 1993, which was
in effect at the time of liquidation, because CBP liquidated the
entries more than six months after suspension of liquidation had
298
been lifted. CBP denied the protest, and Tsubaki then commenced
299
an action at the CIT.
For fifty-one of the entries subject to the
appeal, the CIT held that the entries had not been deemed
300
which
liquidated under the pre-1993 version of the statute,
provided that deemed liquidation did not occur where liquidation
301
had been suspended for four years or more. The CIT further held
that CBP correctly assessed duties pursuant to Commerce’s
administrative review determinations, notwithstanding the long delay
between the lifting of suspension of liquidation (1986–87) and the
302
ultimate liquidation (2000-01).
Tsubaki then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the
CIT’s holding that the pre-1993 version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d)
applied to Tsubaki’s entries and that Tsubaki owed the antidumping
303
duties assessed on them. The court held that, pursuant to the 1993
version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), the date on which CBP receives notice
of the lifting of suspension of liquidation constitutes the “trigger
event” for determining which version of the deemed liquidation
304
Moreover, neither the statutory language in the
statute applies.
1993 amendments nor the legislative history indicated any
305
congressional intent to give the amended statute retroactive effect.
The Federal Circuit also cited its prior decision in American Permac,

298. Id. at 1334. The court explained:
Any entry of merchandise not liquidated at the expiration of four years from
the applicable date specified in subsection (a) of this section, shall be
deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty
asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record, unless liquidation
continues to be suspended as required by statute or court order. When such
a suspension of liquidation is removed, the entry shall be liquidated within
90 days therefrom.
Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (1988)).
299. Id. at 1335.
300. Id. at 1333 (citing U.S. Tsubaki, Inc. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1339
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)). For the remaining five entries, all parties conceded that the
entries had been deemed liquidated at the zero percent antidumping duty rate in
effect at the time of entry. Id. at 1334.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1337.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1336 (citing Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 191 F.3d 1380, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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306

Inc. v. United States, as standing for the proposition that “the 1993
version of section 1504(d) should not be applied to cases in which
suspension of liquidation was lifted and notice to Customs of the
lifting of suspension occurred prior to the effective date of the 1993
307
amendment.” In light of American Permac, the court held that “the
1993 version of section 1504(d) does not apply in this case because
the lifting of the suspension of liquidation and the notice to Customs
of the lifting of the suspension of liquidation occurred long before
308
the effective date of the amendment.”
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Shinyei Corp. of America v. United
309
States involved the second appeal of an action involving the deemed
and actual liquidation of certain entries of ball bearings subject to
antidumping duties. This case had a particularly complex procedural
history and culminated in a stern mandate from the Federal Circuit
to the CIT. In 1990–91, the importer, Shinyei Corporation of
America (“Shinyei”), imported ball bearings from Japan that were
subject to an antidumping duty order and paid cash deposits for
estimated antidumping duties at the applicable ad valorem rate,
310
45.83 percent.
Commerce conducted an administrative review
covering Shinyei’s entries in which Commerce calculated a final
antidumping duty rate that was significantly lower than Shinyei’s
deposit rate—meaning that Shinyei was entitled to substantial
311
refunds of its antidumping duty deposits. Liquidation of the entries
became enjoined as part of a court challenge to Commerce’s final
312
results.
The Federal Circuit issued its final court decision in 1997
affirming Commerce’s review results and, in 1998, Commerce issued
instructions to CBP to liquidate Shinyei’s entries during the 1990-91
313
Due to a drafting error, however, the liquidation
review period.
instructions covered some but not all of Shinyei’s entries during the
314
1990-91 period. Consequently, the entries that were not covered by
the liquidation instructions were deemed liquidated at the

306. Am. Permac, 191 F.3d 1380.
307. United States Tsubaki, Inc., 512 F.3d at 1335 (referencing Am. Permac, 191 F.3d
1380).
308. Id. at 1337 (holding that the earlier version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) applied to
Tsubaki’s fifty-one entries because it was in effect when the triggering event, i.e.,
CBP’s receipt of notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation in 1986–87,
occurred).
309. 524 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
310. Id. at 1278.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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substantially higher 45.83 percent deposit rate—although CBP did
315
not actually liquidate the entries.
Shinyei subsequently appealed the deemed liquidation of the
disputed entries to the CIT, seeking a writ of mandamus to order the
entries’ liquidation at the actual and much lower final calculated
316
rates. While that action was pending, Commerce issued “clean-up”
instructions ordering CBP to liquidate any remaining unliquidated
entries of ball bearings during the 1990-91 review period and, as a
result, CBP actually liquidated Shinyei’s disputed entries at the 45.83
317
percent deposit rate.
In response to this development, Shinyei
withdrew its request for mandamus relief to force liquidation, and it
filed separate actions with the CIT challenging the actual liquidations
318
The CIT then dismissed
(after CBP denied timely filed protests).
Shinyei’s original action for lack of jurisdiction because “Shinyei’s
claim and the relief requested became moot as a result of Customs’
319
In the first appeal
[actual] liquidation of the entries at issue.”
arising out of this case, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s
decision and held that “despite Customs’ actual liquidation of
Shinyei’s entries (pursuant to Commerce’s ‘clean-up’ instructions),
the Court of International Trade retained jurisdiction . . . under
28 U.S.C § 1581(i)(4), the court’s catch-all jurisdictional provision,
covering challenges to Commerce’s ‘administration and
320
The court then remanded the case
enforcement’ of duty laws.”
with instructions that the CIT “reach the merits of Shinyei’s case to
321
determine if Shinyei is indeed entitled to the requested relief.” The
Federal Circuit did not address the deemed liquidation issue in the
first appeal because the disputed entries had been actually liquidated
322
pursuant to Commerce’s clean-up instructions.
On remand, however, the CIT did not address the merits of
323
Instead, it
Shinyei’s case as the Federal Circuit had instructed.
granted summary judgment to the Government and held that
“because Shinyei’s entries ‘were deemed liquidated by operation of
law [before actual liquidation occurred], the final duty [owed] by
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1279.
318. Id.
319. Id. (citing Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 135859 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003)).
320. Id. at 1280 (citing Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
321. Id. (quoting Shinyei Corp. of Am., 355 F.3d at 1311).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1280.
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Shinyei was the rate and amount of duty deposited at the time of
entry or withdrawal from warehouse, not the rate of duty determined
324
by the administrative review.’” It also dismissed Shinyei’s claim that
CBP erroneously liquidated the entries because Shinyei had not filed
a timely protest against the deemed liquidation but, rather, had only
protested the actual liquidations made in response to Commerce’s
325
clean-up instructions.
Expressing deep frustration with the CIT, the Federal Circuit on
the second appeal “again remand[ed] with instructions to the Court
of International Trade to reach the merits of Shinyei’s case” concerning
the alleged errors in Commerce’s original liquidation instructions to
determine whether reliquidation of the disputed entries was
326
appropriate.
Recognizing that it had not addressed the deemed
liquidation issue during the first appeal, the court held that “nothing
in the deemed-liquidation statute forbids the Court of International
Trade from ordering reliquidation as a remedy for Commerce’s
failure to comply with 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(C) in its liquidation
327
instructions to Customs.” In other words, the Federal Circuit found
that 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) did not address reliquidation of deemed
liquidated entries and, therefore, the CIT could order reliquidation
of the disputed entries so that Shinyei could receive the refund of
antidumping duty deposits to which it was entitled—assuming that
the CIT determined that CBP applied the wrong antidumping duty
328
rate when it liquidated the disputed entries. It further ruled that “a
deemed liquidation may properly be protested to obtain
reliquidation in accordance with Commerce’s final review results” to
329
remedy the erroneous liquidation instructions. Finally, the Federal
Circuit held that CBP failed to provide Shinyei with notice of the
330
deemed liquidations. Therefore, the period to protest the deemed
liquidation did not commence until Shinyei first became aware of the
331
deemed liquidation when the actual liquidations occurred.
Because Shinyei filed timely protests of the actual liquidations, the
court ruled that Shinyei had also timely filed protests of the deemed
324. Id. at 1281 (citing Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 2d
1209, 1220 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
325. Id. (citing Shinyei Corp. of Am., 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1220).
326. Id. at 1276 (emphasis in original).
327. Id. at 1282.
328. Id. at 1283 (quoting Koyo Corp. of U.S.A. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1231,
1242 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (explaining that “[u]nder the statutory tariff scheme enacted
by Congress, the character of a deemed liquidation is procedural not substantive”).
329. Id. at 1284 (citing Koyo Corp. of U.S.A., 497 F.3d at 1234, 1237).
330. Id.
331. Id.
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liquidations. In reversing the CIT, the court instructed the CIT to
determine first “whether the deemed liquidation was unlawful and
thus whether Customs should have granted Shinyei’s protests” and, if
they were, “whether Shinyei is entitled to reliquidation” of the
333
disputed entries at the lower rates.
C. Antidumping Duty Methodologies at the Department of Commerce
The Federal Circuit once observed that “[t]he antidumping statute
is highly complex and often confusing, and we accordingly rely on
Commerce in its antidumping determinations to make sense of that
statute. The more complex the statute, the greater the obligation on
334
the agency to explain its position with clarity.”
Given the
complexity of Commerce’s antidumping duty calculations, this
section begins with a brief overview of the calculation methodology to
provide context for the decisions that the Federal Circuit issued in
2008 related to it.
In its simplest form, a “dumping margin” represents “the amount
by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the
335
That is, a
constructed export price) for the merchandise.”
dumping margin represents the difference between the U.S. price
336
(i.e., the “export price” or “constructed export price”) and the
price at which comparable merchandise is sold in the exporter’s

332. Id. at 1286–87.
333. Id. at 1287.
334. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
335. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (2006).
336. Id. § 1677a(a). The antidumping statute defines the “export price” (“EP”) as:
[T]he price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be
sold) before the date of importation by the producer or exporter of the
subject merchandise outside of the United States to an unaffiliated
purchaser in the United States or to an unaffiliated purchaser for
exportation to the United States, as adjusted . . . .
Id.; The statute defines the “constructed export price” (“CEP”) as:
[T]he price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be
sold) in the United States before or after the date of importation by or for
the account of the producer or exporter of such merchandise or by a seller
affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated with
the producer or exporter, as adjusted . . . .
Id. § 1677a(b). Thus, an EP sale is consummated outside the United States prior to
the importation of the subject merchandise whereas a CEP sale is consummated
inside the United States either before or after the subject merchandise has been
imported. Id. § 1677a(a)-(b). The distinction between EP and CEP is relevant
because, under the statute, Commerce makes additional price adjustments to CEP to
take into account the additional expenses associated with U.S. economic activities.
Id. § 1677a(d).
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home market or third country market (i.e., the “normal value”).
The normal value represents the benchmark against which the U.S.
price is compared to determine whether and to what extent dumping
is occurring. If the U.S. price is less than the normal value, then a
positive dumping margin results, which means that the sale was
dumped. Conversely, if the U.S. price exceeds the normal value,
then the sale has a negative dumping margin and is considered not
dumped.
Thus, foreign respondents seek to minimize their
antidumping duty liability by claiming adjustments that either reduce
their normal value or increase their U.S. prices, whereas domestic
interested parties conversely seek adjustments that increase the
respondents’ normal value or reduce the respondents’ U.S. prices.
In order to calculate the U.S. price and normal value, Commerce
begins with the gross prices at which the exporters sell the
merchandise under consideration in the U.S. market and the home
338
market (or third-country market), and it then makes numerous
statutorily prescribed adjustments in order to approximate ex-factory
339
prices. Commerce then determines which normal values should be
used to calculate the dumping margins for each U.S. sale through a
“model match” analysis in which it matches each U.S. sale to a normal
value based on sales of identical products in the comparison market
or, where identical matches are not possible, to a normal value
340
calculated from comparison market sales of similar products.
If
Commerce cannot identify identical or similar products in the
comparison market against which to compare the U.S. sales, then
Commerce will construct a normal value based on the exporter’s

337. Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(A) (“The normal value of the subject merchandise shall be
the price . . . at a time reasonably corresponding to the time of the sale used to
determine the export price or constructed export price . . . .”).
338. Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (describing normal value as the price at which a
“foreign like product” is sold in the exporting country or a third-country market).
339. Id. § 1677b(a)(6) (describing the adjustments made to comparison market
prices to derive the normal value). These adjustments include, inter alia, deductions
for movement expenses, direct and indirect selling expenses, packing costs,
discounts and rebates, and commissions. Id.
340. The model match methodologies employed in antidumping investigations
and administrative reviews differ slightly because, in investigations, Commerce
compares period weighted-average U.S. prices to period weighted-average normal
values on a model-specific basis, whereas it compares individual transaction-specific
U.S. prices to monthly weighted-average normal values in administrative reviews. Id.
§ 1677f-1(d); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c) (prescribing the comparison methods to
be used in investigations versus administrative reviews). In order to simplify the
discussion, the narrative refers to the methodology employed in administrative
reviews whereby Commerce calculates dumping margins for each individual U.S. sale
before calculating the overall weighted-average dumping margin.
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costs plus other statutory adjustments (known as “constructed
341
value”).
After Commerce calculates a dumping margin for each U.S. sale, it
then calculates a weighted-average dumping margin, which is the
overall antidumping duty rate assigned to an exporter, “by dividing
the aggregate dumping margins determined for a specific exporter or
producer by the aggregate export prices and constructed export
342
prices of such exporter or producer.”
The numerator of the
weighted-average dumping margin is the sum of the positive dumping
margins calculated for individual U.S. sales, and the denominator
represents the total U.S. sales value for all U.S. sales.
In
administrative reviews, Commerce currently employs a practice
known as “zeroing” in which it does not permit non-dumped sales
(i.e., sales where the U.S. price exceeds the normal value resulting in
a negative dumping margin) to offset dumped sales (i.e., sales where
the U.S. price is less than the normal value resulting in a positive
dumping margin) in the numerator of the weighted-average
dumping margin.
As a result, exporters participating in
administrative reviews do not receive a benefit from negative
dumping margins, which are set equal to zero in the aggregation of
the total dumping margins.
The World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) has ruled in multiple disputes that Commerce’s zeroing
practice is inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO
343
Antidumping Agreement.
Commerce has abandoned the use of
zeroing in original antidumping investigations but, to date, has
344
refused to do so in administrative reviews.
During 2008, the Federal Circuit issued four separate judgments
involving substantive antidumping duty calculation issues. In each of
the four cases, the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s judgments de
novo and then agreed that Commerce’s determinations were
supported by substantial record evidence and were otherwise in
accordance with law—the same standard of review that the CIT itself
341. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (providing for the use of constructed value if
Commerce cannot determine normal value using home market or third-country
prices).
342. Id. § 1677(35)(B).
343. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007) (finding the United States violated
the requirement to ensure compliance with provisions of General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement).
344. See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average
Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification, 72 Fed.
Reg. 77,722 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 27, 2006) (abandoning the practice of zeroing
when Commerce calculates the overall weighted-average dumping margin in
antidumping investigations using its normal comparison methodology).
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345

Although the appeals court did not extend deference to
applies.
the CIT’s legal conclusions, it still deferred to Commerce where the
agency’s “interpretation of ambiguous statutory language is based on
346
a permissible interpretation of the statute.”
347
In SKF USA v. United States,
the Federal Circuit upheld
Commerce’s discretion to alter its model match methodology and to
employ its longstanding practice of “zeroing” negative dumping
margins when calculating weighted-average antidumping duty
margins. The appeal arose out of an antidumping proceeding
involving ball bearings, which went to order in 1989 and had been
the subject of fifteen annual administrative reviews as of the
348
commencement of the court action.
In the first administrative
review, Commerce developed a model match methodology used to
compare U.S. sales of ball bearings to sales of ball bearings sold in the
349
exporting country (or a comparable third-country market).
Around the time of the fourteenth administrative review, however,
Commerce announced its intention to modify the model match
methodology in order to make it more consistent with the model
match methodologies normally utilized in other antidumping
350
proceedings.
Commerce subsequently implemented the new
model match methodology in the context of the fifteenth
administrative review, explaining that “compelling reasons exist[ed]
to change the model-match methodology,” among them the
345. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained
that the “substantial evidence” standard requires only “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). The Federal Circuit has also clarified that
substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas,
C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Consol. Edison Co.,
305 U.S. at 229).
346. Agro Dutch Indus. Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1024, 1030 (Fed. Cir.
2007); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”); Thai Pineapple Pub. Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Commerce is the ‘master of antidumping law,’ and
reviewing courts must accord deference to the agency in its selection and
development of proper methodologies.” (internal citation omitted)).
347. 537 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
348. Id. at 1375.
349. Id. Under the existing approach, referred to as the “family model-match
methodology,” Commerce grouped U.S. and foreign market sales of ball bearings
into “families” according to eight distinct physical product characteristics. If
Commerce was unable to match U.S. sales of a product to sales in the comparison
market within the identical family (according to the eight product characteristics),
then it simply calculated normal value based on the constructed value. Id. at 1375–
76.
350. Id. at 1376.
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technological advances that made more sophisticated and accurate
351
Also in the fifteenth administrative
model matching possible.
review, Commerce continued its practice of zeroing when calculating
352
the respondents’ weighted-average dumping margins.
SKF USA, an importer of ball bearings from various countries
subject to antidumping duty orders, appealed both methodological
decisions to the CIT, but the lower court sustained Commerce on
353
both issues. SKF USA then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
rejected SKF USA’s arguments and agreed that Commerce’s
decisions were supported by substantial evidence and were in
354
accordance with law.
With respect to the revised model match
methodology, the Federal Circuit first observed that the antidumping
statute was “silent with respect to the methodology that Commerce
must use to match a U.S. product with a suitable home-market
355
product.” Because the statute is silent with respect to model match,
the court stated that it “must defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of a statute even if [we] might have preferred
356
another” under the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron,
357
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. It then deferred
to the agency’s expertise and held that Commerce’s revised model
match methodology constituted a reasonable interpretation of the
statute and was consistent with court precedent requiring Commerce
“to seek out product matches based on the most similar products

351. Id. at 1377 (citation omitted). Under Commerce’s revised model match
methodology, Commerce redefined the “families” to constitute only the first four of
the eight product characteristics used under the former approach. Id. at 1376. For
each U.S. sale, Commerce then determined which comparison market product
within the newly defined family was the most similar to the U.S. product based on a
comparison with the four remaining product characteristics. Id. Thus, Commerce
first attempted to identify products in the two markets that were identical with
respect to all eight product characteristics. Id. Where that was not possible,
Commerce’s new approach permitted comparisons to the “most similar” products
that were identical with respect to the first four characteristics (i.e., within the same
family) but which differed with respect to the remaining four product characteristics
and had the smallest differences in variable manufacturing costs. Id. If Commerce
could not find any identical or similar matches, only then would it resort to
comparing the U.S. sale to constructed value. Id. at 1376, 1378. See generally Koyo
Seiko Co. v. United States, No. 2007-1556, 2007-1557, 2007-1558, 2007-1038, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 25663, at *4–6 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2008) (describing Commerce’s
revisions to the model match methodology in the ball bearings proceedings).
352. SKF USA, 537 F.3d at 1377.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1375.
355. Id. at 1379 (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 66 F.3d 1204, 1209 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).
356. Id. (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
357. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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358

The Federal Circuit upheld
rather than constructed values.”
Commerce’s decision to replace the existing model match
methodology after fourteen reviews, reasoning that Commerce may
modify model match methodologies “where reasonable” and that
359
Commerce had sufficiently cited “compelling reasons” for doing so.
The court also rejected SKF USA’s argument that Commerce
impermissibly applied the new model match methodology
retroactively to sales during the fifteenth administrative review
period, explaining that “[c]hanges in methodology, like all other
antidumping review determinations, permissibly involve retroactive
360
effect” and that Commerce had provided parties with sufficient
361
notice and an opportunity to comment on the intended change.
Finally, with respect to Commerce’s continued reliance on its
zeroing practice, the Federal Circuit simply observed that the court
had consistently upheld the practice in numerous prior cases as a
reasonable interpretation of the U.S. antidumping statute, and it
declined to reconsider the issue because SKF USA failed to raise any
new arguments that the court had not already addressed in those
362
The court also refused to consider the WTO’s
prior cases.
declaration that Commerce’s use of zeroing in administrative reviews
was inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the WTO
363
because the implementation and
Antidumping Agreement
364
interpretation of WTO rulings is reserved for the Executive Branch.
365
In Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit again
affirmed the CIT on issues arising out of the fifteenth administrative
review of the ball bearings proceeding. In this case, four Japanese
358. SKF USA, 537 F.3d at 1380 (citing Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 113 F.3d 897,
902-04 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). The court further observed that “Congress has granted
Commerce considerable discretion to fashion the methodology used to determine
what constitutes [a] ‘foreign like product’ under the statute”). Id. at 1379 (quoting
Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citing Koyo Seiko, 66 F.3d at 1209)).
359. Id. at 1379–80 (ruling that Commerce’s “new model-match methodology not
only reflects a reasonable interpretation of the statute but also comports with [court]
precedent”).
360. Id. at 1381 (citing Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1323,
1334 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
361. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(g)).
362. Id. at 1382 (citing NSK Ltd. v. United States, 510 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Corus
Staal BV v. Dep’t of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Timken Co. v.
United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
363. See discussion supra note 336 and accompanying text (noting that Commerce
has abandoned the use of zeroing in original antidumping investigations but has yet
to do so in administrative reviews).
364. SKF USA, 537 F.3d at 1382 (citing Corus Staal BV, 395 F.3d at 1349).
365. 551 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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ball bearing manufacturers and their U.S. affiliates similarly
challenged Commerce’s decision to modify its model match
366
methodology and to continue employing its zeroing practice.
Additionally, they appealed several aspects of Commerce’s
367
antidumping duty calculations.
Concerning the revised model
match methodology and use of zeroing, the Federal Circuit found
that its prior decision in SKF USA was “controlling on the substance of
those two issues and requires us to affirm Commerce’s new model368
Furthermore,
match methodology and its use of ‘zeroing’ here.”
with respect to the WTO’s ruling that Commerce’s use of zeroing
violated the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the court reiterated that
compliance with WTO determinations is reserved for the Executive
369
Branch.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s
decision with respect to these two issues.
Concerning the plaintiff-appellants’ various challenges to
Commerce’s calculations in the fifteenth review, the Federal Circuit
here too agreed that Commerce’s determination was supported by
substantial evidence and represented a reasonable exercise of its
370
First, the court affirmed Commerce’s decision not to
discretion.
incorporate into its model match determination several bearing types
proposed by a Japanese respondent, NTN, because the respondent
failed to demonstrate that Commerce’s ultimate choice of bearing
371
Second, the court upheld Commerce’s
types was unreasonable.
decision to include NTN’s costs associated with warehousing nondumped merchandise in the total U.S. indirect selling expenses
deducted in the U.S. price calculation—which, if excluded, would
have increased NTN’s U.S. prices and reduced the overall weighted–
average margin—because NTN did not provide sufficient evidence
demonstrating to Commerce’s satisfaction that its calculation
372
methodology did “not cause inaccuracies or distortions.” Third, the
366. Id. at 1288.
367. Id. at 1290.
368. Id. (citing SKF USA, 537 F.3d at 1379–82).
369. Id. at 1291 (explaining that “[i]t would be most inappropriate for this court
on its own to direct Commerce to reopen the Final Results of the 15th review to
consider the impact on its decision of the subsequent WTO ruling”).
370. Id. (agreeing that Commerce acted within its discretion with respect to the
plaintiffs-appellants’ various arguments concerning the antidumping duty
calculations).
371. Id. at 1295.
372. Id. at 1292 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(2)). Commerce’s regulations
express a preference for reporting expenses on a transaction-specific basis rather
than on an allocated basis. 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(1). Where a respondent cannot
report an expense on a transaction-specific basis, then Commerce’s regulations
permit reporting on an allocated basis so long as the respondent can demonstrate
“that the allocation is calculated on as specific a basis as is feasible” and that “the
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court agreed with Commerce’s decision to allocate NTN’s “director’s
fees” between two NTN entities based on each company’s total sales,
rather than wholly excluding the director’s fees from the one NTN
entity that did not import ball bearings, because NTN had not
demonstrated that its allocation methodology was as specific as
possible and did not cause inaccuracies or distortions in the
373
Finally, the Federal Circuit held
antidumping duty calculations.
that Commerce reasonably included in the calculation of total U.S.
indirect selling expenses the additional costs associated with benefits
paid to Japanese nationals working in the United States on behalf of
another Japanese manufacturer, NSK, because NSK incurred those
expenses to compensate employees whose work benefited U.S. sales
374
of ball bearings.
The Federal Circuit ruled on another Commerce decision
concerning the U.S. price calculations in Florida Citrus Mutual v.
375
United States.
The issue on appeal was whether Commerce
reasonably interpreted the phrase “United States import duties”
under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A), which pertains to movement
376
expenses deducted in the calculation of EP and CEP, to reflect the
net import duties that the importers paid to CBP upon entry of the
377
In the underlying
subject merchandise into the United States.
proceeding, Commerce permitted the respondents, Brazilian orange
juice producers and exporters, to offset the U.S. customs duties that
they paid by the amount of duty drawback that they applied for and
378
received pursuant to CBP’s drawback programs.
Under these
programs, an importer may receive refunds of customs duties if
articles that it imported were exported, destroyed, or used in further
manufacturing within the United States instead of being sold
379
commercially in the U.S. market. By permitting this claimed offset,
allocation methodology used does not cause inaccuracies or distortions.” Id.
§ 351.401(g)(2).
373. Koyo Seiko Co., 551 F.3d at 1293 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(2)).
374. Id. (citing Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1342 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2007)). The inclusion of these additional indirect selling expenses
lowered NSK’s U.S. prices and, in turn, increased its dumping margins.
375. No. 2008-1102, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25359 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2008).
376. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (requiring Commerce to deduct the costs
associated with transporting subject merchandise from the original place of
shipment in the exporting country to the designated U.S. place of delivery in the
calculation of the U.S. prices used in the dumping calculations).
377. Fla. Citrus Mut., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25359, at *2.
378. Id. at *3–5.
379. Id. at *3 (explaining that the “drawback programs allow foreign companies to
receive refunds of duties paid on merchandise that is exported, or destroyed, within
three years of entry into the United States”). See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1313
(authorizing drawbacks and refunds on imported merchandise); 19 C.F.R. § 191.2(i)
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Commerce calculated lower net U.S. customs duties for the
respondents, which in turn raised their U.S. prices (by virtue of a
smaller deduction) and lowered their overall weighted-average
dumping margins.
The domestic orange juice producers that brought the underlying
petition seeking the imposition of antidumping duties on orange
juice imports, Florida Citrus Mutual et al. (“FCM”), appealed
380
Commerce’s calculation of U.S. import duties to the CIT. The CIT
sustained Commerce’s determination as a reasonable interpretation
of the statute, concluding that “the refunds should be considered
part of the movement expenses enumerated by the statute” and that
permitting the offset resulted in a more accurate calculation of the
respondents’ antidumping duty margins by reflecting the import
381
duties that they actually paid.
In affirming the CIT, the Federal Circuit agreed that Commerce’s
methodology was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and
resulted in a more accurate calculation of the respondents’
antidumping duty margins because granting the offset better
382
reflected the importers’ overall liability for customs duties.
The
court first observed that 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) was ambiguous
insofar as it did not indicate whether “United States import duties”
meant gross import duties (i.e., the duties collected at the time of
importation) or net import duties (i.e., gross duties less any
383
Because the statute on its face was ambiguous and
refunds).
broadly worded, the court next concluded that Commerce’s
interpretation was reasonable under Chevron “because it accords with
the statutory language and accurately reflects the overall duty costs to
384
importers.”
In addition, the court concluded that the drawback
refunds were incidental to the importation of subject merchandise
and should be deducted because they were “contingent upon and
related to importing merchandise because they cannot be claimed
(2008) (defining “drawback” as “the refund or remission, in whole or in part, of a
customs duty, fee or internal revenue tax which was imposed on imported
merchandise under Federal law because of its importation”); 19 C.F.R. § 191.32(a)
(permitting importers to claim “drawback on merchandise which is commercially
interchangeable with imported merchandise if the commercially interchangeable
merchandise is exported, or destroyed under Customs supervision, before the close
of the three-year period beginning on the date of importation of the imported
merchandise”).
380. Fla. Citrus Mut., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25359, at *6.
381. Id. at *7 (citing Fla. Citrus Mut. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
382. Id. at *15–16.
383. Id. at *7.
384. Id. at *13.

2009]

2008 INTERNATIONAL TRADE DECISIONS

1029

without first importing merchandise and paying the duties to
385
Customs.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected FCM’s claims regarding the
reasonableness of Commerce’s methodology for calculating the net
import duties. It held that Commerce was not required to determine
whether the drawback refunds had been “passed through” to the
386
respondents’ U.S. customers. It further concluded that Commerce
reasonably incorporated duty refunds received on subject
merchandise that entered the United States prior to the period
covered by the antidumping investigation because 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(c)(2)(A) did not preclude Commerce from considering
expenses incurred or refunds received after the time of
387
importation.
388
Finally, in Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s judgment to uphold Commerce with
respect to two calculation issues in an antidumping case involving
steel wire rod from Trinidad and Tobago. The plaintiff-appellant,
389
Mittal Steel Point Lisas Limited (“Mittal”), argued that the CIT
erroneously upheld Commerce’s determination to exclude Mittal’s
composite steel rod from the antidumping calculations after
390
Separately, the
classifying it as “non-prime merchandise.”
defendant-cross appellants, Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation and
Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc. (collectively, “domestic
producers”), argued that the CIT incorrectly affirmed Commerce’s
remand determination in which Commerce calculated imputed
credit expenses based on the period from the date of invoice to the
date of payment, rather than on the period from the date of
391
shipment to the payment date as is Commerce’s standard practice.
First, the Federal Circuit agreed that the CIT had correctly
classified Mittal’s composite steel rod as non-prime merchandise. As
385. Id. at *15 (noting that the phrase “incident to” means “contingent upon or
related to something else”) (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 664 (1976)).
386. Id. at *17.
387. Id. at *18–19 (speculating that respondents may import merchandise during
the investigation period for which they may claim duty drawback refunds after
Commerce’s investigation ends and, thus, it is reasonable for respondents to benefit
from refunds received during the investigation period that pertained to pre-period
importations).
388. 548 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
389. Mittal was formerly known as “Caribbean Ispat Limited” and is now known as
“Arcelormittal Point Lisas Limited.” Id. at 1378.
390. Id. (citing Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1222
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
391. Id. at 1381 (citing Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 502 F. Supp.
2d 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
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described above, in its antidumping duty calculations, Commerce
calculates antidumping duty margins by comparing the U.S. price
392
(EP or CEP) to the normal value. In calculating the normal value,
Commerce’s practice is to exclude foreign market sales of “nonprime” merchandise—that is, secondary merchandise that contains
material defects or other commercially significant physical
differences and, consequently, is sold for a lower price—but only if
the respondent did not sell non-prime merchandise to customers in
393
Mittal disputed
the U.S. market during the relevant period.
Commerce’s decision to classify its composite steel rods as non-prime
merchandise—presumably because the inclusion of these lowerpriced sales would have reduced its calculated normal value and, in
turn, would have reduced its overall weighted-average dumping
394
margin.
In any event, the Federal Circuit agreed that Commerce
had correctly classified Mittal’s composite rod as non-prime
merchandise despite the fact that it was otherwise identical to the
company’s prime rod in terms of Commerce’s model match criteria
395
The court noted that Mittal had
and the grade of steel used.
acknowledged that its composite rod was of lower quality and more
inefficient to use than its prime rod because: (1) composite rod
consisted of multiple smaller pieces whereas prime rod consisted of a
single piece of steel; (2) composite rod was sold for a much lower
price than prime rod; and (3) Mittal’s price lists separately identified
396
The Federal Circuit agreed that
prime rod and composite rod.
392. See discussion supra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory
definitions of EP and CEP).
393. Mittal Steel Point Lisas, 548 F.3d at 1378, 1381. If a respondent sold non-prime
merchandise in both markets, then Commerce will compare U.S. sales of non-prime
merchandise only to foreign market sales of non-prime merchandise, and likewise
will compare U.S. sales of prime merchandise only to foreign market sales of prime
merchandise. If a respondent sold non-prime merchandise in the U.S. market but
not the foreign market, then Commerce typically will compare those sales of nonprime merchandise to constructed value rather than comparing them to foreign
market sales of prime merchandise. See, e.g., Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon
Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,220 (Dep’t
Commerce Mar. 17, 2008) (final admin. review) (citing Memorandum from Stephen
J Claeys to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., cmt. 11 (Mar. 10,
2008), available at http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/KOREA-SOUTH/E85302-1.pdf) (explaining that “U.S. sales of prime merchandise are never compared
with home market sales of non-prime merchandise” and that Commerce’s “model
matching methodology in fact prevents any matches of prime to non-prime
merchandise”) (quoting Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From the Republic of
Korea, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,664, cmt. 6 (Dep’t Commerce June 8, 1999)).
394. Mittal Steel Point Lisas, 548 F.3d at 1380–81 (explaining that Mittal argued that
its prime rod and composite rod should be treated as identical products for purposes
of the antidumping duty calculations).
395. Id. at 1382–83.
396. Id.
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these differences were “commercially significant” and that the
classification of composite rod as non-prime merchandise was
397
supported by substantial evidence.
Second, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT on the imputed
credit expense issue after concluding that the domestic producers
had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies on remand with
398
In Commerce’s
respect to Commerce’s calculation methodology.
antidumping calculations, it reduces the CEP by the amount of U.S.
credit expenses, which represent the imputed opportunity cost
incurred by a seller for the period between the time it sells the
merchandise and the time it receives payment from the customer
399
As the length of the credit period
(i.e., the “credit period”).
increases, the amount of the credit expense also increases, which in
turn lowers the U.S. price and increases the overall weighted-average
400
In a remand determination, Commerce
dumping margin.
departed from its normal methodology of calculating the credit
period as the days between the payment date and date of shipment
401
from the seller’s factory, and it instead calculated the credit period
as the days between the payment date and the date of the sales
402
invoice. This methodology resulted in a shorter credit period (and
smaller credit expense) because the invoice date always followed the
shipment date. Commerce then solicited comments on its remand
determination, but the domestic producers never filed any comments
and, thus, “effectively chose not to participate in the remand
403
proceedings.”
In affirming the CIT’s decision to uphold Commerce’s credit
expense calculation, the Federal Circuit held that the domestic
producers “failed to raise the issue at the appropriate time on
397. Id. at 1383.
398. Id. at 1384.
399. Id. at 1379. For example, if a seller receives payment from its customer on
the same day that it makes the sale, then it can deposit or invest the funds and earn
interest on the principal. As payment remains outstanding, however, the seller loses
the theoretical amount of interest that it could have earned if it had already received
the payment. Commerce treats this lost interest revenue as an opportunity cost to
the seller in its antidumping calculations.
400. When Commerce calculates U.S. price on an EP basis, it still makes an
adjustment for imputed credit expenses but not by deducting them from the gross
U.S. sales price. Instead, Commerce adds the U.S. credit expenses to the normal
value used to calculate the dumping margin. Despite this difference in the
calculation methodology, an increase to U.S. credit expenses for EP sales also causes
the calculated dumping margin to increase because larger U.S. credit expenses
increases the normal value.
401. Id. (describing Commerce’s normal practice for determining the credit
period in the imputed credit expense calculation).
402. Id. at 1380.
403. Id. at 1380, 1383–84.
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remand and thus abandoned [their] argument by failing to exhaust
404
[their] administrative remedies before Commerce.” It further held
that neither the “purely legal argument” nor “futility” exceptions to
405
the exhaustion principle applied.
Moreover, the court concluded
that, even if it had to address the substantive merits of the domestic
producers’ arguments, it would still uphold Commerce’s remand
determination as supported by substantial evidence and in
accordance with law because the record evidence showed that Mittal
did not begin extending credit to its customers until it issued the
sales invoice, making the date of invoice a more appropriate starting
406
point for the credit period than the date of shipment.
D. Injury Analysis at the International Trade Commission
Before the United States may impose antidumping duties, U.S. law
407
requires that the ITC determine affirmatively that the domestic
industry that produces the “domestic like product”—i.e., a product
that is similar in characteristics to the product that is the subject of
408
the antidumping action —is materially injured or threatened with
material injury “by reason of” the dumped imports from foreign
409
countries covered by the action.
In order to find that dumped
imports have presently caused material injury to a domestic industry,
404. Id. at 1384; see also Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 599 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (“[N]o one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.”); AIMCOR v.
United States, 141 F.3d 1098, 1111–12 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that Aimcor “was
precluded from raising . . . [an] issue de novo before the court” because it chose not
to raise it on remand to Commerce).
405. Mittal Steel Point Lisas, 548 F.3d at 1384 (explaining that the domestic
producers’ arguments regarding the use of shipment date versus invoice date in the
credit expense calculation was not “purely legal” but, rather, raised factual questions
regarding Commerce’s practice, and that raising arguments to Commerce would not
have been “futile” in light of Commerce’s express solicitation of comments on the
appropriateness of its proposed remand methodology).
406. Id. at 1384–85 (finding that the material sales terms were not established
until after Mittal’s U.S. affiliate issued the invoice).
407. The ITC is an independent federal agency composed of six commissioners—
three from each political party—each entitled to cast a single vote as to whether he
or she believes that material injury or threat of material injury exists. Under the
statute, in the event of a tie vote on whether injury exists, the agency will enter an
affirmative determination favoring the domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11). For
purposes of determining whether injury exists, a Commissioner’s vote is considered
“affirmative” if he or she finds that material injury exists presently or if he or she
finds that the domestic industry is threatened with material injury. Id.
408. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (defining “domestic like product”).
409. See id. § 1673 (prescribing the requirements for imposing antidumping
duties). In countervailing duty cases, the ITC employs the same standards for
evaluating whether subsidized imports have injured a domestic industry. Id. §
1671(a). For simplicity, this section refers to the ITC’s injury analysis only in the
context of antidumping actions. Id. § 1671(a).
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the ITC considers three factors: (1) the volume of subject imports;
(2) the effects of subject imports on U.S. prices for the domestic like
product; and (3) the impact of subject imports on the domestic
410
Therefore, in a textbook
industry’s U.S. production operations.
case, the ITC typically finds that a domestic industry has been
materially injured where, in the three years preceding the
antidumping petition, subject import volumes have increased
significantly, the prices of subject imports have either forced U.S.
producers to lower their prices (price depression) or prevented them
from increasing their prices (price suppression) of the domestic like
product, and the condition of the industry has deteriorated as
evidenced by, inter alia, declining financial indicators (including
profitability), reduced production, capacity, or capacity utilization,
increasing inventories, reduced commercial shipments, and declining
411
In a threat case, the ITC finds that the
employment levels.
domestic industry has not been materially injured during the prior
three-year period, but that the trends of import volumes, prices, the
U.S. industry’s financial condition, and other economic factors
strongly indicate that “further dumped . . . imports are imminent”
and “material injury by reason of imports would occur unless an
412
order is issued.”
A critical component of the ITC’s injury analysis is causation—that
is, whether the domestic industry had been materially injured, or is
being threatened with material injury, “by reason of” dumped
413
imports. There must be a causal connection between the condition
of the domestic industry and the presence of dumped imports in the
414
U.S. market. In Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, the Federal
Circuit concentrated on the causation element of the injury analysis
and set forth the “replacement/benefit test.” The court held that
410. Id. § 1677(7)(B)(i).
411. Id. § 1677(7)(C).
412. Id. § 1677(7)(F)(ii). In considering whether subject imports threaten to
cause material injury, the ITC considers numerous economic factors, including the
existence of unused production capacity or substantial increases in production
capacity in the countries covered by the petition, significantly increasing import
volumes or market penetration, demand for subject imports, whether imports have
had significant price depressing or suppressing effects, inventories of subject
merchandise, the potential for product-shifting in foreign production facilities,
negative effects on the development and production efforts of the domestic industry,
and any other adverse trends indicating the likelihood of material injury caused by
subject imports. Id. § 1677(7)(F)(i).
413. See id. § 1673 (authorizing the imposition of antidumping duties if
Commerce affirmatively finds that dumping has occurred and the ITC affirmatively
finds that the domestic industry is materially injured, or is threatened with material
injury, “by reason of” dumped imports).
414. 444 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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“whenever the antidumping investigation is centered on a commodity
product, and price competitive non-subject imports are a significant
factor in the market,” the ITC must “explain why—notwithstanding
the presence and significance of the non-subject imports—it
concluded that the subject imports caused material injury to the
415
Thus, the Bratsk decision required the ITC to
domestic industry.”
apply the replacement/benefit test in investigations involving
fungible commodity products as part of the causation analysis. This
additional analysis, in turn, could make it more difficult for domestic
industries to prove the existence of material injury in such cases.
Litigation regarding the Bratsk replacement/benefit test ensued
thereafter. In 2008, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in Mittal
416
Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States in which it clarified the scope of
the replacement/benefit test.
The appeal arose out of an
antidumping duty investigation against steel wire rod from twelve
countries, among them Trinidad and Tobago, in which the ITC
concluded in its final determination that the domestic industry had
been materially injured “by reason of” subject imports from Trinidad
417
Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. (formerly, Caribbean
and Tobago.
Ispat Ltd.) appealed the ITC’s final determination with respect to
418
On appeal, the
Trinidad and Tobago, which the CIT upheld.
Federal Circuit remanded the decision with instructions that the ITC
perform a Bratsk analysis and “make a specific causation
determination” as to whether other dumped imports or imports from
non-subject countries “would have replaced [Trinidad and Tobago’s]
419
imports without any beneficial effect on domestic producers.”
On remand, the ITC concluded that, if it strictly applied the
statutory factors governing its injury analysis, then the record
evidence supported an affirmative determination that subject imports
from Trinidad and Tobago had caused present material injury and

415. Id. at 1375.
416. 542 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
417. Id. at 870. In its injury analyses, the ITC normally performs a single injury
analysis by cumulating the data from all countries subject to the petition. However,
in the case at issue, the ITC considered Trinidad and Tobago separately from the
other eleven subject countries pursuant to a provision of the antidumping statute
precluding the ITC from cumulating imports from countries covered by the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”), such as Trinidad and Tobago,
with imports from non-CBERA countries in its injury analysis.
19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(G)(ii)(III).
418. Mittal Steel Point Lisas, 542 F.3d at 869–70 (citing Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v.
United States, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005)).
419. Id. at 870 (citing Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v. United States, 450 F.3d 1336, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
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also threatened to cause material injury to the domestic industry.
Nevertheless, the ITC issued a negative injury determination,
asserting that it felt compelled to do so by the Federal Circuit’s
421
remand instructions and by the analysis prescribed under Bratsk.
The ITC reasoned that the domestic industry could neither overcome
a presumption that non-subject imports would have replaced subject
imports from Trinidad and Tobago nor could the industry
demonstrate that it would have benefited from the exclusion of
422
subject imports from the U.S. market. The ITC further stated that
its conclusion applied equally to its analyses of present material injury
423
and threat of material injury. The CIT affirmed the ITC’s remand
424
determination.
Two domestic producers, Gerdau Ameristeel Corp. and Keystone
Consolidated Industries, Inc. (collectively, “the domestic producers”),
425
The Federal Circuit
appealed the CIT’s remand determination.
held that its prior remand instructions and the Bratsk decision did
not require the ITC to conclude that dumped imports from Trinidad
and Tobago had not caused material injury and, therefore, it vacated
the CIT’s judgment with instructions that the CIT again remand the
426
case to the ITC for further consideration of the injury issues.
As part of its analysis, the Federal Circuit first clarified the purpose
of the Bratsk “replacement/benefit test.” According to the court, the
ITC has considerable discretion to determine the methodology for
evaluating whether present material injury or threat of material injury
exist, but the governing law requires the agency to consider all
relevant economic factors related to the injury analysis and articulate
427
The Bratsk decision
reasoned explanations for its determinations.
stands for the proposition that the ITC must consider all “important
aspect[s] of the causation analysis,” one of which is “whether nonsubject imports would have replaced subject imports without any
420. Id. at 870–71.
421. Id. at 871.
422. Id.
Two Commissioners dissented from the ITC’s negative injury
determination after concluding that steel wire rod is not a fungible commodity
product, whereas the other Commissioners presumed that steel wire rod was a
fungible commodity product. Id. at 871–72. On this matter, the Federal Circuit held
that the ITC wrongly interpreted the Federal Circuit’s remand instructions as barring
any further analysis of whether steel wire rod is a fungible commodity product, which
is a prerequisite finding for a Bratsk analysis. Id. at 875. The court stated that the
ITC could reconsider the issue of fungibility on remand. Id.
423. Id. at 871.
424. Id. at 872.
425. Id. at 869, 872.
426. Id. at 869.
427. Id. at 872.
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The court
benefit to the domestic industry,” the court reasoned.
explicated that if the ITC finds that the domestic industry would not
have benefited from the absence of subject (dumped) imports in the
U.S. market during the investigation period, that fact strongly
indicates that the presence of subject imports did not cause any
429
injury that the U.S. industry had experienced.
The Federal Circuit next clarified its intended framework for the
Bratsk test. According to the court, the ITC wrongly considered
whether the elimination of subject imports from the market after the
imposition of an antidumping duty order would benefit the domestic
430
The ITC misapplied the Bratsk test by focusing on the
industry.
potential effectiveness of an antidumping duty order, that is, whether
non-subject imports would replace subject imports if subject imports
disappeared from the U.S. market as a consequence of an
431
Rather, the ITC should have considered
antidumping duty order.
whether the domestic industry would have benefited from the
hypothetical elimination of subject dumped imports during the threeyear investigation period, or whether non-subject (or non-dumped)
imports would have replaced the subject dumped imports with no
432
corresponding benefit to the domestic industry.
By evaluating
whether the domestic industry would have benefited from the
theoretical elimination of subject imports in the past, the court
reasoned, the ITC could determine if the domestic industry had been
injured during the investigation period “by reason of” subject
433
imports.
The Federal Circuit continued that the ITC: (1) wrongly applied a
rebuttable presumption, as part of its Bratsk analysis, that non-subject
imports would replace subject imports if the subject imports were
theoretically eliminated from the U.S. market; and (2) wrongly
428. Id. at 874 (citing Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, 444 F.3d 1369,
1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
429. See generally Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 722 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (requiring the ITC to demonstrate in its affirmative injury determinations that
“the harm occurred ‘by reason of’ the [dumped] imports, not by reason of a minimal
or tangential contribution to material harm caused by [dumped] goods”).
430. Mittal Steel Point Lisas, 542 F.3d at 876.
431. See id. (explaining that, under the Bratsk decision, “in cases involving
commodity products in which [non-dumped] imported goods are present in the
market, the Commission must give consideration to the issue of ‘but for’ causation by
considering whether the domestic industry would have been better off if the dumped
goods had been absent from the market”).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 877 (emphasizing that the Federal Circuit “regard[s] the inquiry into
‘but for’ causation as a proper part of the Commission’s responsibility to determine
whether the injury to the domestic industry is ‘by reason of’ the subject imports” and
cannot be reasonably attributed to factors other than subject imports).
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concluded that it must issue a negative injury determination unless
the domestic industry rebuts the presumption of replacement
434
According to the court, the domestic industry is
without benefit.
not required to “prove the negative” with respect to the causation
analysis but, rather, the ITC must “give full consideration to the
causation issue and . . . provide a meaningful explanation of its
conclusions” as part of its statutory obligation to determine whether
435
subject imports caused material injury to the domestic industry.
Under the holding of Bratsk, the ITC must consider and explain—for
fungible commodity products—whether, during the investigation
period, non-subject (non-dumped) imports would have replaced
subject dumped imports in the U.S. market without any benefit to the
436
domestic industry.
Finally, the Federal Circuit did not rule on whether the Bratsk
analysis applies to the ITC’s threat of injury analysis. Rather, the
court simply observed that the ITC erred as a matter of law by
applying a rebuttable presumption in the threat context, but it did
437
not state that the ITC may not apply Bratsk to its threat analysis.
Thus, the court left open the question of whether the ITC must
perform the replacement/benefit test in the context of a threat
analysis.
E. Byrd Amendment Issues
In 2000, Congress amended the antidumping statute by enacting
the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“CDSOA”),
or “Byrd Amendment,” which redirected antidumping and
countervailing duties that CBP collected from the general U.S.
438
Treasury to certain “affected domestic producers.”
Congress
enacted the CDSOA to compensate those domestic producers who
brought or supported the original antidumping or countervailing
duty petition for the material injury that they experienced from
434. Id. at 877 (“Contrary to the Commission’s interpretation, we do not regard
the decision in Bratsk as requiring the Commission to presume that producers of
non-subject goods would have replaced the subject goods if the subject goods had
been removed from the market.”).
435. Id. at 878 (citing Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, 444 F.3d 1369,
1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
436. Id. at 878–79 (internal citations omitted).
437. Id. at 879.
438. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000) (repealed 2006). See generally Valerie A. Slater &
Jarrod M. Goldfeder, 14th Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International
Trade: “Show Me the Money”: A Practitioner’s Guide to the Intersection of Customs and
AD/CVD Law, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 78–84 (2007) (providing a detailed
description of the process by which CBP distributes antidumping and countervailing
duties to affected domestic producers under the CDSOA).
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439

The CDSOA directed CBP to distribute
unfairly traded imports.
collected duties on an annual basis to domestic producers that
satisfied certain regulatory requirements entitling them to
distributions, which were designed to reimburse their “qualifying
expenditure[s]” incurred after the issuance of the antidumping or
countervailing duty orders and with respect to their production of
440
Despite its
the same product as that subject to the order(s).
enormous popularity with U.S. industries, Congress repealed the
441
CDSOA in 2006 in response to mounting pressure from the United
States’ trading partners that culminated in a WTO dispute settlement
report finding that the CDSOA constituted “a non-permissible
specific action against dumping or a subsidy” under the WTO
442
agreements.
Under the terms of the repeal, however, affected
domestic producers remained eligible to receive distributions of
antidumping or countervailing duties collected on entries made
443
through September 30, 2007.
Since its passage, the CDSOA has been the subject of numerous
444
legal challenges within the U.S. courts. In 2008, the Federal Circuit
439. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a) (providing for distribution of assessed antidumping
and countervailing duties to affected domestic producers); see also 19 C.F.R. §
159.61(a) (providing for distribution of assessed duties for certain qualified
expenditures).
440. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(4); 19 C.F.R. § 159.61(c) (identifying as “qualifying
expenditure[s]” the costs for manufacturing facilities, equipment, research and
development, personnel training, acquisition of technology, health care benefits for
employees paid for by the employer, pension benefits for employees paid for by the
employer, environmental equipment, training, or technology, acquisition of raw
materials and other inputs, and working capital or other funds needed to maintain
production).
441. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4,
154-55 (2006) (repealing the CDSOA effective for entries on or after Oct. 1, 2007).
442. United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶¶ 273–74,
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
443. Deficit Reduction Act § 7601(b).
444. See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. United States, Nos. 2008-1005-1008, 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2964 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (holding that the CDSOA’s support provision
did not violate the First Amendment because nothing in the statute or legislative
history suggested that the CDSOA was intended to suppress expression of opposing
views, and also that it did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because the provision of benefits to domestic producers who supported
the underlying antidumping or countervailing duty petition was rationally related to
the U.S. Government's legitimate interest in enforcing the trade laws); PS Chez
Sidney v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1330 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2006), reh’g granted in part, reh’g denied in part, 502 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2007) (holding that the CDSOA’s definition of “affected domestic producers” as
limited to only those companies that were part of the petitioning group or otherwise
expressed support for an antidumping or countervailing duty petition violated the
First Amendment’s protection against compelled speech because it conditioned
eligibility for receipt of the government benefit on the particular opinion expressed
on the underlying petition); Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm, 285 F.
Supp. 2d 1371 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003), aff’d, 400 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
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decided another major case affecting domestic producers’
entitlement to CDSOA distributions in Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance
445
v. United States. In this case, the court affirmed a CIT ruling that the
application of the CDSOA to imports from Canada and Mexico
violated section 408 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
446
Under section 408, any
(“NAFTA”) Implementation Act (“NIA”).
amendment to the U.S. antidumping laws that Congress enacted after
the NAFTA went into effect “shall apply to goods from a NAFTA
447
country only to the extent specified in the amendment.” In affirming the
CIT, the Federal Circuit agreed that the CDSOA represented an
amendment to the U.S. antidumping statute and that nowhere did
448
the amendment expressly state that it applied to NAFTA countries.
As such, Commerce and CBP could not apply the CDSOA to
imported merchandise from Canada and Mexico given the plain
449
language of section 408 to the NIA.
The Federal Circuit also addressed the appellants’ various
arguments that section 408 did not apply to the CDSOA. First, it
rejected their argument that the CDSOA does not “apply to goods”
within the meaning of section 408, reasoning that:
[W]hile it is true that the CDSOA does not regulate goods directly,
such as by flatly prohibiting their sale or use, the CDSOA surely
does “apply to goods” in the sense relevant to antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, which are designed to regulate the market
for goods in an attempt to compensate for anti-competitive
450
behavior.

Second, the court disagreed that Congress intended for section 408
to apply to the CDSOA, finding instead that Congress was cognizant
that certain domestic producers were ineligible for CDSOA distributions because
they filed their applications beyond the established deadline and did not timely
petition the ITC to include them on the list of eligible recipients).
445. 517 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, United States Steel Corp. v.
Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 129 S. Ct. 344 (2008).
446. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 517 F.3d at 1324; see also NAFTA
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473).
447. 19 U.S.C. § 3438 (2006) (emphasis added). The Code specifically states:
Any amendment enacted after the Agreement enters into force with respect
to the United States that is made to—(1) section 303 or title VII of the Tariff
Act of 1930, or any successor statute, or (2) any other statute which—(A)
provides for judicial review of final determinations under such section, title,
or successor statute, or (B) indicates the standard of review to be applied,
shall apply to goods from a NAFTA country only to the extent specified in
the amendment.
Id.
448. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 517 F.3d at 1325, 1342.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1342.
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of the applicability of section 408 when it passed the CDSOA and
would have explicitly stated that section 408 did not apply if it
451
Third, the Federal Circuit dismissed the
intended that outcome.
appellants’ claim that the CDSOA falls outside the scope of section
452
408 because Congress enacted it as part of an appropriations bill.
Even if Congress passed this legislation pursuant to its constitutional
spending power to assist domestic producers affected by unfair trade,
the court concluded, Congress ultimately amended the antidumping
statute in order to do so and, as such, it falls under the purview of
453
section 408 of the NIA.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CIT’s holding that the CDSOA does not apply to antidumping
and countervailing duties assessed on imports of goods from Canada
or Mexico, and it affirmed the CIT’s decision to issue a permanent
injunction enjoining the continued distribution of antidumping and
countervailing duties assessed on the orders against hard red spring
454
wheat from Canada.
Apart from addressing the merits of the NAFTA challenge, the
Federal Circuit in Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance also decided a
number of procedural issues related to standing, mootness, and
causes of action of the claims brought by the plaintiffs (the
Government of Canada and several Canadian producers of hard red
spring wheat, magnesium, and softwood lumber) challenging CBP’s
distributions of duties under the CDSOA. First, with respect to
standing, the Federal Circuit considered whether two plaintiffs, the
Government of Canada and the Canadian Wheat Board (“CWB”),
455
had satisfied the standing requirements.
At the outset, the court
distinguished between: (1) Article III standing under the U.S.
Constitution, which requires that a plaintiff demonstrate an “injuryin-fact” caused by the complained-of conduct and which can likely be
456
redressed by a favorable court decision; and (2) prudential standing
451. Id. at 1343.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1343–44.
454. Id. at 1325, 1344. Because the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s judgment in
favor of plaintiffs from the Canadian softwood lumber and magnesium industries,
the permanent injunction applied only to antidumping and countervailing duties
assessed on entries of hard red spring wheat from Canada pursuant to the claim
raised by the Canadian Wheat Board. Id.
455. Id. The CWB became the only remaining plaintiff-appellant after the Federal
Circuit concluded that the claims of the other plaintiffs-appellants had been
rendered moot. See id. at 1342 (explaining that the CWB had both standing and a
cause of action to bring its appeal involving Commerce’s antidumping and
countervailing duty case against hard red spring wheat from Canada).
456. Id. at 1331 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992)).

2009]

2008 INTERNATIONAL TRADE DECISIONS

1041

under the APA, which confers standing if the interest for which the
plaintiff seeks protection is “within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
457
The court then affirmed the CIT’s ruling that the
question.”
Government of Canada lacked independent Article III standing
because Canada failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact independent
458
of the injury alleged by the Canadian producers.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit held that the CWB satisfied Article
III standing because the distribution of antidumping and
countervailing duties to the affected domestic producers under the
CDSOA “was likely to cause an economic injury to the Canadian
Wheat Board” through increased competition and loss of market
share resulting from the monetary assistance provided to its U.S.
competitors, and “because this injury would be prevented by a
459
declaratory judgment and injunction against such distribution.”
The court likewise concluded that the CWB had prudential standing
because it sought protection under the auspices of section 408 of the
NIA, which embodies a form of preferential tariff treatment in the
form of limitations on the United States’ ability to amend the
460
antidumping statute with respect to NAFTA countries.
The court
agreed that the CWB has an interest in that preferential tariff
treatment for which it sought protection, which therefore conferred
461
prudential standing.
Second, with respect to mootness, the Federal Circuit explained
that no “case or controversy” exists for purposes of Article III of the
U.S. Constitution if a plaintiff’s claims cease to exist at some point
462
during the litigation. The court then considered certain events that
had occurred in the context of the softwood lumber and magnesium

457. Id. (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970)).
458. Id. at 1338. The CIT originally dismissed the Government of Canada’s claim
after concluding that Canada lacked standing because it had sought relief through
the WTO dispute settlement system. Id. at 1331. The Federal Circuit disagreed with
the CIT’s rationale because the Government of Canada did not seek to litigate the
same claim in the WTO and before the U.S. courts, but it nevertheless agreed that
Canada lacked standing on alternate grounds. Id. at 1336.
459. Id. at 1334 (explaining that the CIT correctly invoked the doctrine of
“competitor standing” and found that the CWB had demonstrated injury-in-fact
through increased competition or assistance to its competitors resulting from the
distribution of antidumping and countervailing duties under the CDSOA).
460. Id. at 1335.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 1338 (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397
(1980)) (explaining that a litigant’s claim must continue throughout the duration of
the litigation).
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463

It concluded that the
cases since the CIT had issued its ruling.
plaintiffs from the Canadian softwood lumber industry no longer had
a live injury-in-fact for which the courts could provide relief because
the United States and Canada had entered into a bilateral agreement
that revoked the orders against softwood lumber from Canada and
retroactively terminated the distribution of antidumping and
464
countervailing duties to the domestic industry. Likewise, the court
concluded that plaintiff Norsk Hydro Canada, the sole Canadian
magnesium producer, no longer had a stake in the appeal because
Commerce had revoked the countervailing duty order against pure
and alloy magnesium and Norsk Hydro was closing its magnesium
465
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
plant.
softwood lumber and magnesium plaintiffs’ appeals had been
rendered moot, and it vacated the CIT’s judgment with respect to
their claims and remanded the case with instructions that the CIT
466
dismiss their complaints.
Finally, the Federal Circuit also considered whether the CWB had
alleged a valid cause of action under section 102(c) of the NIA, which
provides that “[n]o person other than the United States—(1) shall
have any cause of action or defense under—(A) the Agreement or by
467
The court rejected the
virtue of Congressional approval thereof.”
claim of defendants-appellants, a coalition of domestic producers,
that the CWB could not raise a cause of action under section 102(c)
468
of the NIA. The court held that section 102(c) precludes causes of
action under NAFTA itself or under section 101 of the NIA, which
pertains to Congress’s approval of the NAFTA treaty, but that section
463. See generally Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States, 913
F.2d 933, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[A] reviewing court is not precluded . . . from
considering events which have occurred between the date of an agency (or trial
court) decision and the date of decision on appeal.”).
464. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 517 F.3d at 1339 (citing Certain Softwood
Lumber Products from Canada, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,714 (Oct. 19, 2006) (revocation of
countervailing duty order)) (noting that CBP liquidated all entries of softwood
lumber from Canada and refunded all antidumping and countervailing duty
deposits).
465. Id. at 1330, 1339 (citing Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from
Canada, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,382 (July 6, 2006) (revocation of countervailing duty
order)) (concluding that Norsk Hydro’s plant closure meant that the company no
longer competed with affected domestic producers of magnesium and no longer
suffered competitive injury from CDSOA distributions).
466. Id. at 1344. Because the court concluded that the CWB’s claim remained
valid and that it had standing to bring its appeal, the Federal Circuit could proceed
with considering the merits of its claim because at least one plaintiff had standing.
Id. at 1339 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264
(1977)).
467. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c).
468. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 517 F.3d at 1339–40.
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102(c) does not preclude causes of action from private parties under
469
section 408.
III. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS
The Federal Circuit most commonly hears appeals of international
trade disputes involving the actions of CBP, Commerce, or the ITC.
However, in 2008, it issued two separate decisions involving the
USTR, which is responsible for developing and maintaining the
administration’s trade policy, including the resolution of trade
470
Gilda Industries,
disputes with the United States’ trading partners.
471
Inc. v. United States (hereinafter referred to as Gilda Fed. Cir. I and
Gilda Fed. Cir. II), addressed the authority of the USTR to maintain
products on a “retaliation list” pursuant to the Trade and
Development Act of 2000. Under the “carousel provision” to this law,
the USTR must adjust retaliation lists periodically unless one of two
exceptions applies—either:
(1) the USTR “determines that
implementation of a recommendation made pursuant to a dispute
settlement proceeding . . . is imminent,” or (2) the USTR “together
with the petitioner involved in the initial investigation . . . agree that
472
it is unnecessary to revise the retaliation list.” The Federal Circuit’s
decisions in Gilda focused principally on issues of appellate
procedure rather on the substantive aspects of the USTR’s authority
to compile and maintain retaliation lists.
The appellant, Gilda Industries, Inc. (“Gilda”), challenged the
USTR’s compilation and maintenance of a retaliation list authorized
by the WTO as part of an ongoing dispute between the United States
and European Community (“EC”) over the EC’s import ban on meat
473
from hormone-treated animals.
The retaliation list included
474
toasted breads, which Gilda imported. Gilda commenced an action
at the CIT seeking the court to compel the USTR to remove toasted
breads from the retaliation list and recover duties paid on imports of
toasted bread based on its claim that the USTR failed to satisfy its
legal obligation under the carousel provision to review and adjust
469. Id. at 1340–41.
470. See generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Mission of the USTR,
http://www.ustr.gov/Who_We_Are/Mission_of_the_USTR.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2009) (outlining the responsibilities of the USTR in developing and coordinating
“international trade, commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing
negotiations with other countries”).
471. Gilda Fed. Cir. I, 511 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Gilda Fed. Cir. II, No. 20081344, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24182 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 28, 2008).
472. 19 U.S.C. § 2416(b)(2)(B).
473. Gilda Fed. Cir. I, 511 F.3d at 1349.
474. Id.
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475

The Government moved for
periodically the retaliation list.
dismissal based on its claim that the first exception under the
carousel provision applied, but the CIT dismissed the appeal for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted after
concluding that the second carousel exception relieved the USTR of
476
its obligation to make a periodic adjustment. However, the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded that decision for further proceedings
to determine whether the USTR had lawfully made the required
477
On remand, the CIT
determination under the first exception.
again dismissed Gilda’s complaint after holding that the USTR had
lawfully concluded that no revisions to its retaliation list were
478
necessary.
Gilda decided to appeal the CIT’s decision again, leading to events
that the Federal Circuit addressed in Gilda Fed. Cir. I. On the final
day of the sixty day period in which Gilda had to appeal the CIT’s
dismissal, Gilda’s counsel attempted to docket an appeal
electronically via the CIT’s website, but logged off the website before
479
The next day, counsel
obtaining final confirmation of receipt.
discovered that Gilda’s notice of appeal had not been recorded on
the prior day, and counsel immediately completed the electronic
form and provided the requisite payment, meaning that the CIT
480
technically received the notice of appeal on day sixty-one. A week
later, after the CIT docketed the appeal, Gilda’s counsel filed a
motion for a one-day extension of the filing deadline for its notice of
481
The CIT denied the motion
appeal, claiming excusable neglect.
and subsequently dismissed the appeal after concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the untimely filed notice of
appeal, and the Federal Circuit also dismissed the appeal because it
482
was untimely filed.
Gilda then commenced another appeal at the Federal Circuit
regarding the CIT’s denial of Gilda’s motion to extend the filing

475. Id.; Gilda Fed. Cir. II, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24182, at *2.
476. Gilda Fed. Cir. II, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24182, at *2–3 (explaining that the
domestic beef industry agreed with the USTR that no revisions to retaliation list were
necessary).
477. Id. at *3 (citing Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir.
2006)); see also Gilda Fed. Cir. I, 511 F.3d at 1349.
478. Gilda Fed. Cir. I, 511 F.3d at 1349 (citing Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States,
No. 03-00203, slip op. 06-149, 2006 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 151 (Oct. 10, 2006)).
479. Id. at 1350.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1350 (citing Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 216 Fed. App’x 973
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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483

This time, the Federal Circuit reversed and
deadline by one day.
remanded the case to the CIT. Although Gilda’s notice of appeal
had been untimely filed, the court held that jurisdiction did not
484
transfer from the CIT to the Federal Circuit as a result. Rather, the
CIT retained jurisdiction over the motion to extend the filing
deadline because the untimely filing of the appeal “neither conferred
jurisdiction on this court nor divested the trial court of jurisdiction to
485
entertain Gilda’s subsequent motion to extend the filing deadline.”
The court, therefore, ruled that the CIT should have disregarded the
clearly defective notice of appeal and considered the motion to
486
extend the filing deadline.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
instructed the CIT on remand to consider the merits of Gilda’s
487
motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal.
On remand, the CIT agreed that Gilda had demonstrated
excusable neglect for its untimely filed appeal notice, and its original
appeal concerning the USTR’s exercise of its statutory responsibilities
488
proceeded, which led to the issues addressed in Gilda Fed. Cir. II. In
this second appeal, Gilda challenged the CIT’s decision to dismiss
Gilda’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
489
be granted.
Gilda claimed that the CIT exceeded its authority by
considering whether the USTR satisfied its obligations under the
second carousel exception because the Federal Circuit had limited its
remand instructions to whether the first carousel exception had been
490
satisfied. However, the court held that the CIT was free to address
whether the second exception had been satisfied because the issue of
the second exception was not before the Federal Circuit at the time
491
Because the
of its first opinion and, thus, had not been resolved.
court’s remand instructions did not preclude the CIT from
considering the second exception, the Federal Circuit upheld the
492
CIT’s decision to consider whether it applied.

483. Id.
484. Id. (“Ordinarily, the act of filing a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an
appellate court and divests the trial court of jurisdiction over matters related to the
appeal.”).
485. Id. at 1351.
486. Id. at 1351–52 (citing 20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 303.32[2][b][iv][A] (3d ed. 1997)).
487. Id. at 1352.
488. Gilda Fed. Cir. II, No. 2008-1344, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24182, at *3–4 (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 24, 2008).
489. Id. at *4.
490. Id. at *4.
491. Id. at *5–6.
492. Id. at *6–7.
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IV. TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The Federal Circuit considered an appeal arising out of an
environmental case before the CIT in Salmon Spawning & Recovery
493
Alliance v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, although, as in many
other decisions in 2008, the holding focused solely on procedural
issues.
The plaintiff-appellants, a coalition of non-profit
environmental organizations dedicated to protecting wild fish, sued
multiple federal agencies and officials—including CBP and its
commissioner—for alleged violations of the Endangered Species Act
494
(“ESA”) of 1973. Under section 9 of the ESA, it is illegal to import
495
In order to
any species deemed “endangered” or “threatened.”
ensure that the import bans are properly enforced, section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA requires federal agencies to consult with Commerce’s
National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) to “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter
in this section referred to as an ‘agency action’) is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
496
threatened species.”
The plaintiff-appellants asserted that the defendant federal
agencies and officials had violated section 9 of the ESA by allowing
493. 532 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g granted, withdrawn, 550 F.3d 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit originally issued its opinion on July 15, 2008.
However, the defendants subsequently petitioned for a rehearing concerning one
aspect of the original determination, namely, whether the CIT could exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). After
considering the defendants’ arguments, the court withdrew its original opinion and
issued a revised opinion that rescinded its original analysis regarding the availability
of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, all references herein are to the Federal
Circuit’s revised opinion issued on December 18, 2008. See Salmon Spawning &
Recovery Alliance v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 550 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
494. See Salmon Spawning & Recover Alliance, 550 F.3d at 125 (explaining that the
ESA authorizes enforcement responsibility to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(Department of Interior), National Marine Fisheries Service, CBP, and the Coast
Guard).
495. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). The statute states that:
[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf—(A) to enjoin
any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; or
(B) to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant to section 1535(g)(2)(B)(ii)
of this title, the prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to section
1533(d) or 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title with respect to the taking of any
resident endangered species or threatened species within any State; or (C)
against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure Secretary to perform
any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with
the Secretary.
Id.
496. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
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imports from Canada of certain types of salmon and steelhead that
the ESA identified as threatened and endangered fish rather than
497
They further alleged
enforcing an existing ban on such products.
that the defendants had violated section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, as well as
the APA, by failing to consult with the NMFS regarding the proper
498
enforcement of the import ban. The plaintiff-appellants originally
commenced the action in the Western District Court of Washington,
but that court transferred the case to the CIT after concluding that it
499
The CIT, in turn, found that it lacked subject
lacked jurisdiction.
matter jurisdiction over the section 9 claim “because the exercise of
the agency’s enforcement powers ‘lie solely within the agency’s
500
The lower court further held that the plaintiffdiscretion.’”
501
appellants did not have standing to bring a claim under section 7.
On appeal, the plaintiff-appellants sought reversal of the CIT’s
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (section 9) and lack of standing
(section 7). The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s dismissal of the
section 9 claim regarding the enforceability of the import ban against
502
the ESA-listed salmon and steelhead. The court reviewed section 9
and concluded that the federal agencies’ enforcement provisions
503
thereunder were discretionary in nature.
It then reasoned that,
under the APA, “an agency’s decision not to undertake enforcement
504
actions is ‘presumptively unreviewable.’”
Because the plaintiffappellants failed to overcome the presumption of unreviewability, the
Federal Circuit agreed that the CIT lacked subject matter jurisdiction
505
over the section 9 claim.
However, the Federal Circuit concluded that the CIT erred in
dismissing the section 7 claim for lack of standing. The court
explained that, in order to establish standing under Article III of the
Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it has suffered an
injury-in-fact from the defendants’ challenged conduct and that a
506
favorable court decision could likely redress the alleged injury. The
CIT had dismissed the plaintiff-appellants’ section 7 claim after
497. Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance, 550 F.3d at 1125–26 (citing 50 C.F.R.
§ 223.1102(c)).
498. Id. at 1126–27.
499. Id. at 1127.
500. Id. (citing Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Basham, 477 F. Supp. 2d
1301, 1308 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
501. Id.
502. Id. at 1130.
503. Id. at 1129 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(3)).
504. Id. at 1128 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).
505. Id. at 1129.
506. Id. at 1130 (citing Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (internal citations omitted)).
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concluding that a favorable court decision would not entitle them to
507
The Federal Circuit, in contrast,
relief for their alleged injury.
concluded that the CIT misinterpreted the “redressability” criterion.
It reasoned that, “[u]nder a proper analysis, the plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged the elements of standing to preclude dismissing
508
The court
the case for lack of standing based on the pleadings.”
ruled that the plaintiff-appellants had alleged a sufficient injury-infact in the form of the “aesthetic, recreational, and environmental
interests of their members” to observe the salmon and steelhead in
509
their habitats.
Next, the court agreed that the defendants’ failure
to enforce the import ban “adversely affected and irreparably
injured” the plaintiff-appellants because their actions or inactions
510
had “jeopardized the continued existence of the listed salmon.”
Because a favorable court decision enforcing section 7 would compel
federal agencies to undertake additional consultations in furtherance
of the import ban, which is the protected interest, the Federal Circuit
agreed with plaintiff-appellants that the redressabiltiy criterion had
511
Accordingly, the court reversed the CIT’s dismissal
been satisfied.
of the section 7 claim for lack of standing and remanded the case
with instructions that the CIT determine if it had exclusive
512
jurisdiction to hear the section 7(a)(2) claim. The Federal Circuit
further held that, if the CIT determined on remand that it did not
have jurisdiction over the section 7 claim, then it should transfer the
513
case back to the federal district court.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1131.
509. Id.
510. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992), and
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
511. Id. at 1130–31.
512. Id. at 1131. The Federal Circuit declined to rule on whether the CIT had
exclusive jurisdiction over the section 7(a)(2) claim because the CIT had not yet
considered the issue. Id. at 1133. Therefore, it remanded the issue to the CIT to
determine whether the section 7 claim fell under its exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
However, the court did opine that the CIT might find that it has exclusive
jurisdiction over the section 7 claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3), which confers
exclusive jurisdiction arising from any U.S. laws “providing for . . . embargoes or
other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other
than the protection of the public health or safety,” or under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4),
which confers exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions arising from the
“administration and enforcement with respect to the matters” referred to in
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3). Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.C (concerning the CIT’s
jurisdiction over civil actions involving alleged embargoes in Sakar Int’l Inc. v. United
States, 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, No. 07-1173 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10553 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008), appeal
dismissed, 2008 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 126 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 3, 2008)).
513. Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot.,
550 F.3d 1121, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it will not defer to
514
the legal conclusions of the CIT.
Indeed, in the twenty-seven
appeals from the CIT decided in 2008, the Federal Circuit fully
affirmed the CIT on all issues in only fourteen of them, thus partially
or fully reversing the CIT in nearly half the cases on appeal. Most
cases where the Federal Circuit fully affirmed the CIT involved
complex factual questions involving tariff classifications or
Commerce’s antidumping duty methodologies in which the courts
defer more to the agency’s expertise than to the lower court’s
judgment. Conversely, the Federal Circuit took a hard line with the
CIT on procedural issues involving jurisdiction and standing, as
evidenced by the significant number of reversed or vacated decisions
that the appeals court issued. Thus, the decisions issued in 2008 were
particularly instructive regarding general jurisprudence before the
Federal Circuit with respect to the litigation of complex international
trade disputes.

514. See, e.g., Agfa Corp. v. United States, 520 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

